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Dr. Phiph~t Tangsubkul
SEAPOL Director
Institute of Asian Studies
Chulalongkorn University
BANGKOK
Thailand
Dear Dr. Phiphat,
Herewith, as promised, please find enclosed my
manuscript titled "A Synthesis of Thailand's Positions in
the Light of the New Law of the Sea".
It is approximate to
what you have described, and hopefully introduces the main
themes in the four problem areas you would like to have
specifically emphasized.
Incidentally, my Dutch Colleague from The Hague,
Professor Ko Swan Sik of the T.M.C. ASSER Institute, plans
to visit Bangkok next February 7-8, 1988, and I have recommended
that he should meet with you.
Please feel free to advise
him about Thai legislation and documentation.
With best wishes for the New Year,

Yours sincerely,

\fort /v.
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Sompong Sucharitkul
Robert Short Professor of International Law
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A SYNTHESIS OF THAILAND'S POSITIONS
IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA

by
SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL*

I.

GENERAL PURPOSE AND OBJECT

This prelude serves as an overture to the study
in greater depth of the policies and positions of THAILAND
in regard to the new law of the sea.
this introduction to project an

An endeavour is made in

overview of Thailand's

stand on certain vital issues and questions raised by the
new prospect and predicament.

Thailand's standpoint is

grounded on a variety of policy considerations.
is seasoned by the passage of time.
altogether without trials and errors.
one,

Her attitude

Its formation is not
In more areas than

Thailand is indeed experiencing untold tribulations.

This prologue is intended to foreshadow the overall results
of concerted

efforts

to coordinate

and harmonize the

interests of various sectors of Thai society and to reconcile
the views of competent agencies, participating in policy
decision-making in the negotiating process of the new law
of the sea.

To a considerable extent, Thailand's national

interests are closely affected by the changes envisioned
in the recent U.N. Convention on the law of the Sea,

2/ ...

*
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1
This latest Convention takes the
Montego Bay, 1982. ]
form of a codification package, of which the contents have
been delicately balanced,

the text intensely negotiated,

the provisions carefully assembled and the instruments neatly
put together with assured concordance
official languages.

for

each of the

This comprehensive treaty is meant

to prescribe a uniform standard of State conduct, its rights
and obligations in related fields for generations

to come.

It is often difficult to assess with reasonable
precision the extent of a nations's awareness of the issues
and problems facing its government in the wake of far-reaching
progressive developments of rules of international law regarding
the status and permissible use of the resources of the sea.
The difficulty is multiplied in any attempt to evaluate
the

readiness, willingness and ability of a nation such

as Thailand to cope with the new situation, entailing the
unenviable task of comprehending

the availability of potential

wealth and resources and the intriguing mystery of the profound
ocean floor.

The sea has not ceased to provide a challenge

for mankind.

At the same time,

and livelihood for sea-faring
Thailand

it is a source of life
nations

from time immemorial,

included.
As a coastal

S~~te,

Thailand has had to learn to

defend herself against the continual waves
expansion

from afar,

of ,colonial

warding off one by one the onslaught

of gunboat diplomacy, at its peak, from distant

lands,

stemming the ugliest tide of aggression from overseas with
sword and plough, and repelling alien

invading forces

3/ ...
1]

The Law of the Sea, Official Text of the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, New York, 1983.
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by the combined use of her inner strength, popular resilience,
national unity,

cultural maturity_· and a touch of tactful

diplomacy that is typically Thai.
In terms of national security, the sea has not
exactly served as a barrier to obstruct prospective intruders.
Rather unkind to the host country, the ocean has opened
several sea lanes to provide easy access to this hospitable
"Land of a Thousand Smiles". Unlike some island
whose territorial integrity
intact

kingdoms

has been preserved virtually

by the good grace of the cruel seas,

the Kamikaze

winds as well as treacherous rocks and under-currents, which
time and again turned back or swept away hostile armadas,
Thailand's axe-like pennisular

position protruded

warm shallow waters of her enticing

Gulf

by the

lined by the

silvery sand of her peaceful and friendly shores have increased
rather than decreased her security risks.

The right of

transit passage presents a dilemma which must
with the greatest caution. In this context,

be viewed
the adoption

of a properly balanced compromise may better serve Thailand's
security interests.
Instead of presenting natural obstacles to wouldbe trangressors

from beyond the sea, the Gulf of Thailand

has afforded a place of refuge for many a vessel in distress.
Friends and foes alike have found Thai shores to be their
ideal havens,

complete with natural shelter,

fresh water, luscious food
profusion.

and luxuriant

supply of

fruits in utter

Popularly known as ''the rice bowl of Asia",

Thailand has earned the

reputation of an oldest and most

experienced rice-growing community with expertise also in
fish culture.

Freedom of the sea means to the Thais freedom

of navigation, freedom of overflight and freedom to fish.
Fish and rice constitute the staple diet of the Thais for
as long as memory of man can run.

As the ancient description

4/ ...
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of the golden age of Sukhothai goes :
free is truly good.
in the paddy...

11

This land of the

There are fish in the water and rice

Thus

has

been

the most vivid depiction

of the peace and prosperity of Sul<:hothai Thailand,

<vhile

freedom and independence have always had to be defended
and maintained,

they first had also to be won and established.

In this connection, food and agriculture have provided a
crucial key to Thailand's success in achieving and furthering
her healthy growth and economic

development.

Fishery

constitutes a sector of primary importance in Thailand's
agricultural extension program.
brackish

This includes fresh-water,

water as well as salt water fish, shrimp, shell-

fish and sea-food of various species.

Thailand is not only

self-sufficient in food, but is also a major food exporter
in grains and cereals

as

well as in sea-food, poultry

and other sources of protein.

In national planning,

fishery ranks second only to defence and security.

therefore
The

extended national jurisdiction over the 200 miles
of' Exclusive Economic Zones implies a drastic curtailment
of Thailand's traditional distant water fishing grounds.
The Gulf of
untapped resources

Thailand is also endowed

with virtually

in minerals and natural gas. The country

has only just begun to explore and exploit its off-shore
non-living resources under the sea-bed.

Considerable problems

and complications have emerged in connexion

with

new advanced technology of production,,management
Highly perplexing
del imi.ta t ion

the
and distribution.

problems appear to have arisen in the

of maritime boundary.

Without a clearly

delineated line agreed upon by interested parties, all plans
for exploration and exploitation of natural resources could
not effectively proceed.
particular area,

It will be seen how in

this

Thailand has lost no time in starting

negotiations and in reaching agreements with her neighbours,

5/ ...
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adjacent and opposite,

in order to

enable herself to implement

whatever economic development plans the nation has devised
for the exploitation of sub-marine areas bordering neighbouring
States.
Disputes are believed to be better avoided or prevented from arising than subsequently resolved

or settled,

in the same way as prevention seems more desirable than
cure,

as a matter of health-care

policy.

Thailand offers

an interesting case study for experimentation in conflict
resolution

or pacific settlement of disputes.

A restatement

and clarification of Thailand's policy and position in this
context appears to be warranted and timely.

This may in

turn serve to explain her attitude towards a number of important
issues.
Last but not least is the desirability of measures
to be taken towards securing

a pollution-free community.

Conservation has been a constant theme in the policies respecting
marine'environment.

Clean air and unpolluted sea are clearly

targets to be achieved through international cooperation.
Abatement

of activities generating

initial step to ensure circulation

pollution is only an
of cleaner air and purer

water in the ocean and the superjacent

atmosphere.

Leaving aside for the time being the feasibility
of deep sea-bed mining and the international regime to be
established for the management of the common heritage of
mankind,

this introduction is leading to a

synthesis

of policies and positions: adopted by Thailand in preparation
for the entry into force of the impending Convention on
on the Law of the Sea.

It is proposed to examine

~he

impact

of the new law in as far as it touches and affects the national
interests of Thailand in at least four interrelated principal

6/ ...

areas, viz.,
3)

1)

The Exclusive Economic Zone;

Disput~Settlement;

areas,

2) Transit Passage;

and 4) Marine Pollution.

In each of these

it will be shown how Thailand has come to grip with the situation

and learned to formulate her positions, taking into account the available alternatives and policy options.

In this process, no nation

can be said to be totally uninfluenced by considerations other than
purely national interests.

A number of pertinent factors, vital or

material interests and other extraneous policy considerations have
been scrutinized and carefully weighed before national position
is formulated and finally taken on each pain~ not'without prior consultations with nations or groups of nations sharing common positions,
advantages and disadvantages.

II.

1.

THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

THAILAND'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CODIFICATION AND

PROGRESSIVE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

..
,·J

It has frequently been said that the new United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature at Montego
Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982, constitutes a historic milestone,
marking the culmination of over 14 years of work,

involving parti-

cipation of more than 150 countries, representing various regions
of the world.

These countries have different legal and political

systems, and are in different stages of socio-economic development.
They are countries with various dispositions regarding the types of
minerals found in the sea-bed, including coastal States, geographically disadvanbtaged States, archipelagic
land-locked States.

States, island States and

They all convened for the purpose of establish-

ing a comprehensive regime

"dealing with all matters relating

the law of the sea, bearing in
are closely interrelated and

to

mind that the problems of ocean space
need to be considered as a whole."

7 I . ..

.
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The elaboration of the Convention represents an attempt to establish
true universality in the effort to achieve a "just and equitable
international economic order governing ocean space." 2]
The Convention contains the constituent instruments of two
major international organizations, namely, the Authority (articles
156-191), including the Statute of the Enterprise (Annex IV), and
the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(Annex VI : Statute). In addition, it represents not only the codification of customary norms, but also the progressive development
of international law. The precise extent of the combination between
codification of existing customary law and progressive development
of new law depends on the moment of determination, as subsequent
practice of States also operates to accelerate the ripening process
of conventional law into an established custom.
The concept of an exclusive economic zone (E.E.Z.) of two
hundred nautical miles measured from the straight baselines of a
coastal State is relatively new. Whatever the degree of novelty and
regardless of the precise moment of crystallisation, it cannot now
be gainsaid that E.E.Z. is not here to stay as a generally accepted
norm of international law, endorsed by the practice of States evidencing the emergence of new rules of customary international law. 3]
8/ ...
2]

See Introduction to the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, ibid.,
at p. XIX.

3]

See, e.g., Ted L. Mcdorman,
"Thailand's Fisheries: A Victim
of 200-Mile Zones",
Ocean Development and International Law,
Vol. 16, No.2, pp. 183-209, at pp. 187-188.
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Without at this stage taking issues with any of the propositions relating to the comprehensiveness or finality of the Convention
of 1982 or the proportion between the parts that are customary law
and those involving substantial modifications by treaty provisions
binding on parties,
and transitory

Thailand is well aware of the inexhaustiveness

character

of any man-made norms. As a Buddhist nation,

Thailand understands the intertemporal

character of international

law, which moves and continues to grow with the movement or passage
of time.

The Convention of 1982 represents an accelerated and timely

growth of the corpus juris oceaniJ
process in progress

a ceaseless and continuing

since time immemorial,

especially precipitated

by the Codification Conferences of 1958 and 1960.
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is unprecedented
in its wholesomeness or indivisibility
is a compact integral whole.

of its component parts.

Other significant features,

It

such as

the number of sessions or the length of time it took to reach agreement
on the finalisation

of the negotiating text,

are no longer unique

as most contemporary codification conferences are now attended by
as many delegations although not as large and as lengthy
of the duration of the conference.

In this connection,

in terms
the process

of multilateral treaty-making has been reviewed and standardized in
a report of the working group,
the General Assembly in 1984

adopted by the Sixth Committee of
4]

after eight years of studies and

deliberations by experts in the field.

The techniques

recent Convention of 1982 are relatively new,

used in the

but the novelty reflects

only variations of existing practice without drastically departing
from pre-existing methods.

The provisions confirming existing practice

have been drawn freely from the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the
LavJ of the Sea

5]

and even earlier exercises such as the Harvard

9/ ...
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4]

Report of the Working Group on the Review of Multilateral Treaty
Making Process, A/C.6/39/L/2, November 27, 1984.

5]

The Work of the International Law Commission, 3rd edition, U.N.,
New York, 1980, pp. 140-165.

l

•l

l
I

.. 1
'-i

J

'

~

.,:j

SUCHl\ETT;<UL/9

Research in the 1930's. 6]

Indeed,

been omitted or overlooked,

none of the existing rules has

some although largely outmoded

embodied without much discussion,

were

while new areas and new concepts

were initiated and negotiated by representatives of governments without
the benefit of legal expertise and draftsmanship of the International
Law Commission.

Real political and economic bargaining and negotia-

tions wre conducted admidst the acceptance of the bulk of
body of existing laws and customs of the sea,

the entire

the corpus juris

oceani.
Gradually maritime jurisdiction of a coastal State has been
extending by leaps and bounds,

from straight baselines, including

widening bays and enlarged jurisdiction

around islands, to

differences in the growing width of territorial waters from three
nautical miles

canon-shot rule

to four Scandinavian marine leagues

in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1950) 7]

and thence to the

exclusive fishery zone of 50 miles in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (Merits),

U.K.

v.

Iceland

(1974)

8]

and ultimately the

E.E.Z. 9]

200-mile

Thailand has not been insensitive to these changes.
of her illustratious

international jurists, Dr.

One

Thanat Khoman,

was an active member of the International Law Commission in the late
1950's

when the draft articles on the Law of the Sea were discussed.

Prince Wan Waithayakorn, Krommun Naradhip Bongsaprabhand, President
10/ ...

6]

See, e.g.,

Harvard Draft,

7]

I.C.J.

8]

I.C.J. Report, 1974,

9]

See, e.g.,
Article 57
Economic Zone.

Report,

1951,

pp.

29 A.J.I.L. Sepcial Supp.

(1935).

116 et seq.

pp. 3 et seq.
of the Convention, Breadth of the Exclusive

SUCHARITKUL/10

of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, was elected President
of the First and Second Conferences on the Law of the Sea,
1958 and 1960.

Geneva

The notion of the sea being a common heritage of man-

kind was warmly embraced by Prince Wan

already in 1958

ed the presidency of the First L.O.S. Conference.

10]

as he acceptTwo hundred

miles zone has become a living nightmare for Thai fishermen and fishing industry from the very start,

ever since Professor Francois,

the Dutch Special Rapporteur, suggested in one of his earlier reports
to the International Law Commission that coastal States should be
given the right to adopt fishery conservation measures within a 200mile zone off their coasts.

These measures were to be binding on

other States which could submit their disputes to the International
Court of Justice if found to be unjustified.
made in 1951,
of ''mar

11]

This suggestion was

one year before the famous Santiago Declaration

patrimonial"

of 200 miles by Chile, Peru and Ecuador. 12]

For the protection of the living resources of the sea, the Special
Rapporteur carne to the conclusion that the diversity of circumstances
in which conservation measures could ideally be taken in the various
parts of the world and with respect to different species was such
that the coastal State in each situation is in the best position to
take necessary rneasure$j

having regard to existing bilateral and multi-

lateral treaties.
11 I . ..

10] First Plenary Session, Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva,
February 24, 1958, P.V. p. 3, para 37.
11] U.N. document A/CN.4/42, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1951, Vol.II, p. 88, para 80.
121 Andres Aguilar, "The Patromonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept''.
San Diego Law Review, 1974, pp. 571-602.

sc:..:lU\R ITKUL/ 11

Subsequent events and in particular the 1958 and 1960
Conferences on the Law of the Sea were highlighted by further efforts
on the part of coastal States and island States, especially archipelagic States, to enclose certain areas of the highseas as lying
within their exclusive fishery jurisdiction

Indonesia and the

Philippines provide clear illustrations of archipelagic States.

13]

The 1960's were marked by the rapid development, by a limited number
of countries, some of them developing countries such as Thailand and
the Republic of Korea, of long-ranging fishing fleets operating
throughout the oceans of the world.

In addition,

the traditional

capacity of developed countries such as Japan, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
which have long engaged in distant-water as well as deep-sea fishing
in pratically every sea around the globe, the distant-water fishing
industries in the handful of the developing world

put

up

consider-

able investments and efforts to this end, resulting in overfishing
in the many areas of the Pacific, the Atlantic and the North Sea.
In most cases,

regional fishery commissions lacked the power and

the economic and political wills to prevent or slow down the decline
and collapse of important fish stocks.
countries,

14]

Other developing

lacking the financial means and practical experience,

and fearing depletion

of existing stocks within their reach before

they could begin to exploit them,
of over-fishing

naturally reacted to the prospect

by extending their protective exclusive fishing zone

to 200 miles, a trend that has since been difficult to resist, let
alone to reverse.

Thailand did her utmost to resist the irresistible

trend which ultimately swept her along with Japan and Korea from their
feet.

For all that, she supports the Convention for what it is worth,

believing that the existence of an international regime provides
greater protection for developing countries than the primitive state
of lawlessness,

in which the weak must succumb to the gunboats of

the strong.
12/ ...
13] For instance, Indonesia already presented the archipelagic concept
at the 1958 Conference, and proceeded to grant licences
to foreign fishing vessels in 1968 as soon as the U.N. seabed
sub-committee was established.
14] See, e.g., Jean Carroz, the Management of Humanity's Resources:
The Law of the Sea, Workshop 1981. Hague Academy of International
and U.N. University 1980.

SUCl-U',RJ:'J.'KlJL/ 12

2.

THAILAND'S POSITION IN REGARD TO THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
The statistical data staring into Thailand's face portends

a frightening prospect of neighbouring coastal States enforcing their
exclusive economic zones to the extent of excluding Thai fishing fleets
from these zones which used to serve as Thailand's distant-water fishing grounds.

Indeed,

the figure of 99 per cent

of total world

catch of fish from within 200 miles exclusive economic zones of
coastal States was most alarming.
The upsurge

of Thailand's fishing industries, placing

the country as the leading distant-water fishing nation in SouthEast Asia, may be a source of national pride,
a rootcause

of chronic migrain

but it is equally

for those responsible for policy-

planning and decision-making in connexion with aquaculture,
fishery management and export of sea-food product.
Thailand's emergence as one of the top ten fishing
nations of the world in the 1970's coincided with the initial
implementation of the 200-mile
trawling

exclusive fishery zone.

The

techniques in distant-water fishing for shrimps and

other surface water species have been learned principally from
Japanese fishery schools and from training institutions on the
west coast of North America, with the result that for a few recent
decades (1950-1080)

Thailand's Fishery Department and Thai

Delegation to fishery conferences could consult more closely
with their Japanese counterparts without the aid of interpretation.

In more ways than one,

nations, Japan

as distant-water fishing

and Thailand are sharing a similar fate.

It

should not come as a surprise that, in the circumstances,
Thailand could learn very useful and interesting lessons from
Japan's position and practice.

The fates of the two nations

are similar but by no means common.
13/ ...

.'
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a)

E.E.Z. viewed as most damaging to Thailand's fishing interests
The 1982

Convention

on the Law of the Sea was adopted

as a package without any possibility of reservation for any of
its provisions.
in toto

It is a Treaty that must either be accepted

or rejected.

Thailand cannot afford not to accept it

regardless of whatever minor abatement she could introduce

in

the negotiating process.
In this context, the E.E.Z. appears to be the most dreaded portion of the Convention from Thailand's standpoint.
ing the practice of States,

Observ-

it can be seen that within the region

Thailand was decidedly the very last State to make any move towards
claiming her own E.E.Z.

The position taken by Japan and its

timing may have served as a cue

for Thailand to react.

Being

among the very few nations that have been heavily engaged in
distant-water fishing,

Thailand is included in a small minority

group among coastal States.
The concern for Thailand's vital interests in the new
law of the sea was discernible

from her active participation

in the F'irst Committee's discussicm of the regime of the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction in 1967, 16]
1r1hich accounted for Thai land's designation by the First Committee
Chairman, Ambassador F'ami
committee established as

(Egypt), as member of the seabed suba stepping stone along the path leading

to the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Thus, during

an early session of UNCLOS III in 1974, although to no avail,
Thailand endeavoured to have her status recognized as a
14/ ...
16]

Ambassador Joe Pardo of Malta introduced this item in
the First Committee of the General Assembly during its regular
session in 1967.
Australia and Thailand cooperated closely
at committee level. The main problem then was deep-sea mining and
and the concept of the common heritage of mankind.

SUCHARITKUL/14

geographically disadvantaged State. 17]

Up to the final round

of the Third LOS Conference in April 1982, Thai Delegation still
hoped for a miracle in this particular connexion.
proposal by Za1re was supported by Thailand.

Thus, a

This would have

entitled States to the surplus of living resources in a coastal
State's extended zone even where the coastal State in fact did
not reach its harvesting capacity and a surplus resulted. 18]
This proposal did not find sufficient support and was not actively
pursued during the last negotiating session.
Thailand has had to be content with whatever improvements
could successfully be introduced into the text of the provisions

of the

new law of the sea to alleviate

Thai fishermen in distant-waters.
to the surplus allowable catch,
a mitigating
account

the plight

of

Apart from possible access '
paragraph

.3 of Article 62 entails

effect by obliging the coastal State to take into

"the requirements of developing States in the subregion

and region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to
minimize dislocation

in States whose nationals have habitually

fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in
research and

identificati~

of stocks." 19]

15/ ...

17]

Thailand suggested that there should be a sharing of the
living resources in an extended zone on an equitable basis
and a right of compensation for those States which would
become zone-locked by neighbouring extended zones and
thereby deprived of an economic benefit once enjoyed.
UNCLOS III, official Records, Vol. 1, July 10, 1974, p.
147 and Vol. II, August 1, 1974, p. 192.

18]

See comments by Mr. Sucharitkul, Thai Delegate, in the
170th Plenary Meeting, UNCLOS III,
April 16, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.62/SR. 170/22, April 1980, pp.6-8. Zaire's
Draft Amendment to Article 62 in U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.
107, April 13, 1982.

19]

Article 62 (3), A/Conf.62/122, October 7, 1982, reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. (1982), pp. 1261 et seq.

·'
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Article 73 (Enforcement of Laws and Regulations of the
Coastal State)
for Thai

may be viewed as affording some measure of relief

fisherme~

vessels and crews.

Paragraph 2 stipulates

that ''arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released
upon the posting of reasonable bond
Paragraph 3 provides that
of fishery

laws

or other security." 20]

''coastal State penalties for violation

and regulations in the zone may not include

imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by
the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment."21]
Paragraph 4 requires the coastal State in case of arrest
detent, ion of foreign vessels to

or

"promptly notify the flag State,

through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any
penalties subsequently imposed."

22]
17 I . ..

20]

See, ibid., Article 73.

21]

Article 72, paras (2) and (3) appear to reduce appreciably!
the hardship suffered by Thai fishing fleets and their~
At any rate, the vessels and crews could be released
forthwith upon posting of reasonable bond or other securlt~~
The practice in the recent decades has been most unkind
to Thai fishermen, especially Burma, Bangladesh, Vietnam,
Indonesia and even Malays~a.
Negotiations were often
protracted and fishermen detained as well as the fishing
vessel~ and catches confiscated.

tCr.ews .-

22]

The incident involving "The Changyee'' is notorious.
This
was a research fishing vessel provided by Japan to the
Southeast Asian Fishery Centre (Singapore base), complete
with Japanese teaching staff and crew.
The trainees were
nationalsof member States of the Southeast Asian region.
They were\. detained in Burma for months on end despite
collective and official protests from the Centre and member
States.

SUCHARITKUL/lZ

b)

Policy options and measures to abate damages to fishing industry
Apart from the humanitarian principles contained in

Article 73 toning down the harshness of penalties and measures
taken by coastal States in the enforcement of their laws and
regulations which

could entail correctional or remedial

effect

for the tail end of the sufferings by fishermen, and the remote
possibility of Thailand ever beDefiting

from the agreements

and arrangements to be negotiated with other coastal States in
the subregion or region,

Thailand seems to be doomed to drastic

cuts in her distant-water fishing activities and severe limitations on her total annual catch, subject to costly licensing expenses and procedures as well as hard bargains driven by other coastal
States.

These factors will add to the increasing costs and growing

risks involved in the harvest,
this backdrop

production and marketing.

of prohibitive forces,

Against

the Thai Government does

not have many alternatives aside from a few policy options that
will have to be more energetically and relentlessly pursued
in order to abate the tragic losses if not altogether to avoid
them.

The measures taken by Japan might be emulated.
(1)

Quest for more scientific data regarding
stocks and aquaculture

The need is

badlY' felt to learn all about stocks of
I

various species of interest to the Thai fishing industries;i~p~r~~w(ar
their origins, growth, movements, habits
as well as their cultivation and recycling incentives to promote
optimum utilisation of allowable

catch to be determined for

the areas within Thailand's extended zones
mile

E.E.Z.

including the 200-

This may represent the last retreat back into waters

within Thailand's national jurisdiction.

With all the Thai

expertise available to international organizations and specialized
18/ ...
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agencies such as FAO

23]

and OAU 24],

good men", as the saying goes.
to Ayudhya?

But alas,

"Ayudhaya is not without
what has happened

Disunity caused by outdated bureaucracy has chased

away better brains in order to make room at the top for lesser
minds to prosper. Brain-drain from Thailand has helped the
where it is most needed.

world

Yet it should be pointed out that for

a long time to come Thailand herself stands in greatest need
of such expertise.

It is regrettable ,that vJhi le, the Government

would stop at nothing to unquestioningly secure the services of
foreign experts, the internationally recognized qualities of
her own native specialists are ignored and overlooked.
her back against the wall,

With

Thailand has no choice but to learn

to rise above local political bickering and demestic professional
jealousy, when in fact far more fundamental national interests
are at stake.

Statistics may be consulted in regard to Japan's

enlightened approach to similar problems confronting that island
nation.

Japan's determination, sound scientific research and

good planning have enabled Japanese fishermen to maintain the
existing level of overall

annual catch of over 10 million tons,

fully compensating the 60 per cent reduced tonnage of catch from
the extended exclusive fishery zones of other coastal States,
19/ ...

23]

The fishery experts of FAO, for instance, are principally
Thai nationals, Dr. Aphorn, Dr. Thep and Dr. Vidhya enriched
the fishery expertise of that Specialized Agency of the
United Nations.

24]

Dr. Sawang Charoenphol, former Director-General of the
Fishery Department of Thailand, on the other hand, has
been lending his expert professional advice and services
to countries like Ehiopia and Djibouti in the Red Seas
and other areas far away from Thailand.

25]

A Thai scholar in Japan rather kept his discovery to himself
than publish the findin~ for his doctoral dissertation
to a Japanese Fishery School.
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notably the U.S.A., Canada, Korea and the U.S.S.R.,

by proportionally

increasing her allowable catch off Japanese coasts with repopulated and recycled species within Japan's extended zones with
sufficient flexible margin to spare.

This goal has been achieved

by Japan through various means at its disposal,

namely,

nego-

tiations and friendly persuasions rather than chancing confrontation
and experimenting with conflict resolution.

26]

Whatever losses

Japan has had to sustain as the result of the extension of foreign
E.E.Z.'s,

the public and private sectors of Japan have collective-

ly succeeded in overcoming them.
may not have been as colossal

Thailand's analogous

in terms of magnitude,

problems
she never-

theless needs to learn the hard facts of international life and
to divert her attention
than one,

from national disunity.

In more ways

Thailand's geographical positions have lowered her

odds in this context, with her semi-enclosed sea in the gulf
of Siam and limited access to the Anderman Sea.

The disadvantages

of Thailand's coastlines are to be contrasted with the insular
character of Japanese archipelago,
all directions,

surrounded by waters from

thus blessed with larger elbow and leg room

for manoeuvre.

(2)

Request for external assistance
Against this dim prospect of a lone

sufferer in the region,

Thailand should lose no time to initiate the process of request

20/ ...
26]

Japan has long been engaged in distant-water as well as
deep-sea fishing.
Japanese societies have been able to
conclude all kinds of arrangements,
through joint-ventures
or other cooperative techniques, allowing Japanese fishermen
time to phase out of foreign exclusive economic zones while
regaining greater harvest within her own waters, without
seriously adversely affecting the status quo an~e.
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for external assistance from

s~npathetic

and friendly nations

of the developed world as well as from international organizations
such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies witt1
competence in some of the technical fields found to be different
and most wanting in the areas under Thailand's national jurisdiction.

In this connexion,

a country most likely to appreciate

the problem facing Thailand is probably
sound and valid practical

advic~

and also financial assistance,

Japa~

which could give

both in regard to technical

as Japan is a big importer of

sea-food product from Thailand.

Other developed nations friendly

to Thailand and sympathetic to her plight include Canada, Australia,
New Zealand,

the U.S.A., the Netherlands and the Nordic countries.

The United Nations through its regional commission, ESCAP, and
its specialized agencies,

competent in the relevant fields,

notably FAO, UNESCO, WMO and WHO could in their own specialist
ways contribute to the alleviation of Thailand's problems.
all, however,

Above

Thailand must be reminded of the dire need for

information and assistance,

and must start to learn to appreiate

and welcome meaningful cooperation both in the technology of
a_quaculture,
and marketing.

conservation measures,

production management

Financial assistance and contribution in joint-

ventures should not be ruled out.

Regional centres for research

and training should be further promoted with Japan or other
developed countries as donor.

27]
21/ ...

27]

The South East Asia Centre for Fishery Development with
one department in Smutprakarn and another in Singapore
should be updated to cope with new situations.

(3) Negotiations with neighbouring coastal States
Thai fishermen suffered the most in their activities
in nearby waters off the coast of more or less immediately adjacent
.J_

St~tes•

neighbouring

including Burma, Bangladesh,

Indonesia,

Malaysia and Vietnam, where Thai fishing vessels have been arrested and confiscated and their crews detained and sentenced to
varying prison terms.
of the catch,
fishing

gear~

~1ere

Valuable catches, regardless of the areas

also confiscated along with the vessels and

if found within the national jurisdiction of

neighbouring countries.

The past experience has been painful

and the plight of fishermen only an after-thought.

No effective,

preventive or cooperative measures have been successfully taken.
Thai fishermen must either do or die, either fish in foreign
unfriendly waters and risk prison terms or be deprived of traditional means of livelihood.

Their acquired fishing habits have

not been recognized as acquired rights.

Admittedly, the application

of new rules should not dislocate habitual fishing activities
of friendly neighbours.

Amicable terms should be reached to

permit a graceful transition of gradual withdrawal.
Article 51, paragraph 1 of the 1982 Convention merely
recognized

"traditional fishing rights''

neighbours'',

of

"irrunediately adjacent

but gives no special rights to States that are

not "immediately adjacent".
adjacent neighbour",

Whatever the definition of "immediately

Thailand should be qualified under this

provision with regard to Indonesian archipelagic waters.
Philippines may be less than
Nevertheless,

The

"immediately adjacent neighbour".

both Indonesia and the Philippines have benefited

from Thailand's strong support of the "archipelagic concept"
in the negotiation stage. Now is the time for Indonesia and the
Philippines as fellow founding members of ASEAN to accord a more
favoured treatment to Thai fishermen, especiallY those who have
traditionally fished in their waters.

Thai trawlers could not

benefit substantially from the archipelagic waters of the Philippines

22/ ...
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or Indonesia,

nor could the Philippines or Indonesia benefit

much from Thai trawling

experiences.

Malaysia on the other

hand has concluded an arrangement with Indonesia.28]

Thailand

has been rather slow and inactive in this particular regard.
Her lack of enthusiasm

for the E.E.Z. provisions did not trigger

her abstention in voting on the final text of the Convention.
Strangely enough,

it was more her wish to remain faithful to

the United States to the last hours and thereby hopefully to
be able

subsequently to persuade the United States to re-

enter the world mari·time community by participating in the international regime to be set up for deep sea-bed mining that, to
the incredulous

amazement of ASEAAN colleagues, precluded Thailand

from voting for the
however, that reason.

Convention.

29]

It should be observed,

and ASEAN solidarity ultimately prevailed

and Thailand joined her true friends in the region in signing
the Convention on December 10, 1982.

30]

In any event, no

23/ ...

28] See, e.g., Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia
relating to the legal regime of archipelagic State and
rights of Malaysia in the territorial sea,
archipelagic
waters as well as in the airspace above the territorial
sea, archipelagic waters, and the territory of the Republic
of Indonesia lying between East and West Malaysia, done at
Jakarta, February 25, 1982,
entered into force, May 1984.
See B.A. Hamzak,
"Indonesia's Archipelagic Regime : Implications
for Malaysia",
Marine Policy 8 (1984), pp. 30-43.
29] The Thai Delegation had earlier been working closely with
ASEAN colleagues and Delegations friendly to the U.S.A.,
such as Canada and Australia,
to endeavour to persuade the
U.S. Delegation to vote positively in favour of the text
of the Convention.
30] The Deputy Foreign Minister of . _Thailand, Dr. Arun Panupong.J
himself signed the Final Act and the Convention at Montego
Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982.
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amount of persuasive articulation by ASEAN friends and NATO allies
could dissuade the U.S. Government from adhering to considerations
of short-term national interests

as

conceived by the United

States under current administration.
Initiatives should have been taken already in th,e mid
1970's

to reach

some arrangements or agreements with

of Thailand's neighbours,

in whose extended zones, Thai fishermen

had been engaged in distant-water

fishing.

The situation should

not have gone unnoticed nor allowed to deteriorate.
could reach agreement
phase-out period,

all

If Japan

with the United States for a five-year

why could not Thailand with Malaysia?

Have

we exiled all the good men of Ayudh.ya?
To be up to the task,

it requires more than the knowledge,

willingness and skill to negotiate.
should put their heads together,
taneously

All the sectors concerned

working side by side,

simul-

and concurrently but harmoniously with proper

coordination between the private sectors

within Thailand,

the

Fishing Industries, the Exporting Traders, the Conservation Storage,
etc., and the various government departments concerned, the Fishery
Department,

the External Trade Department and the Economic

Department as well as the Treaty Department in the Ministries
concerned should work together to reach several levels of understanding,

cooperation,

and as joint-venture

and arrangements,

both as treaties

agreements to sooth the pain and reduce

the sufferings of Thai fishing industries.
Proposals have been made for closer collaboration between
Thai private sectors with the South Pacific islands
members of the Pacific Forum,
ing of tuna canning product
as the United States.

for joint-venture

States,

in the manufactur-

to be re-exported to countries such

The time has come and the opportunity

is ripe for such inter-regional cooperation, befitting the

24/ ...
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enterprising character of the Thais as pioneering nation.

3.

31]

THAILAND'S EXPECTATION AND PERFORMANCE
Any enlightened government in Thailand's position will

have to strive relentlessly to struggle for the survival of the
country as a fishing nation,

whose livelihood and export

have substantially depended on fishery.

One courageous

earnings
Prime

Minister of Thailand had to resign in 1979, following the decision
to increase tax on diesel oil, directly affecting the fate of
Thai fishing industries.

If Thai farmers are the backbones

of the country, Thai fishermen

constitute the principal blood

vessels which must keep the body of the Thai nation alive and
in good form.
Several problems of fundamental importance must be faced
squarely.

The Government cannot afford to look the other way.

Unemployment must be alleviated,
decline in fishing industry

over-fishing discouraged, and

upsetting

coastal fishing communities,

with resulting loss of export earning and decline
will all have be amply compensated,

in G.N.P.

if Thailand were to recover

from this serious setback.
25/ ...

31]

Proposals have been made, especially from the South Pacific
island nations as recent as August 1987 in Hawaii
that
Thailand should join foce with the island States with their
extended jurisdiction in the management and production of
cannea tuna for export.
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The coming decade is inevitably a painful period for
reshaping and readjusting the distant-water

overcapacity fleet

and industry to fit the restricted fishing grounds in the 200mile zone

of Thailand. Unlike Japan and the U.S.S.R., Thailand

is neither a developed country nor an industrialized State.
The current trends since UNCLOS III have concentrated upon the
problems of promoting coastal State fisheries expertise such
as Burma, India and Bangladesh within their E.E.Z.s and of restructuring distant-water

fleets of developed

States, such as the U.S.A., the U.K. and Norway.
virtually alone,

or industrialized
Thailand stands

with the exception of Korea, and must devise

her own plan to cope with the disruption of her fishing industry.
In particular,

Thai fishery· may have to be reoriented

in diversified directions guided by numerous considerations.
(1)

Coastal aquaculture

and inland fisheries provide the

potential to maintain and even increase the export market at
its current levels and ensure the continuous supply of marketable
fresh fish for human consumption. Other alternative industrial
use of low-quality catches from the sea should be transformed
into fish meal for animal or poultry feed.
be permitted.

No wastage should

Fresh water fisheries and coastal

aquaculture

should be further developed in close cooperation with China and
Japan for inland species such as salmon

and trout as well as

for brackish water shrimp-culture and coastal species.

In this

connexion, scientific research and marine biology should support
the studies and experiments to recycle and increase the stocks
within Thai waters,
(2)

in order to make up for lost grounds.

Negotiations should be conducted with the view to conclud-

ing agreements and arrangements with Thailand's coastal neighbours,

~
~

notably

Malaysia,

Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma,

Bangladesh and India to allow Thai fishing fleets to fish under

J
J

.I

.1
'
'.l

.1J
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licence in the E.E.Z. 's
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of these neighbouring countries,

ing archipelagic waters.

includ-

Arrangements at governmental level

must also be followed up by cooperation at the private sectors
levels, which may take different forms of joint-ventures.
is the best policy.
the ventures.

Honesty

All partners should benefit equitably

from

Mistakes and misunderstandings should be avoided.

Malpractices and misfeasances should not be repeated. In no circumstances should Thai fishing vessels be allowed or encouraged
by Thai authorities to fish in the coastal waters of Thailand's
neighbours without authorization
or pre-empting

or licence, thus preventing

potential friction in the absence of joint-venture

or other forms of arrangements for mutual benefits.

This will

discourage illegal fishing by Thai fishermen in neighbouring
waters,

which shows the integrity of Thai fishermen in disreput-

able light and places the Thai government in an embarrasing and
costly position of having to intervene to post bond for the release
of the crews and vessels from foreign courts, assuming that the
Convention is implemented.
(3)

Cooperation within the region or sub-region should be

promoted with Thailand partiipating as full partners in any regional
or sub-regional programme such as ASEAN or the Mekong Committee,
or indeed the Southeast Asian region with Japan as donor country.
Cooperation with other regions should not be precluded.
may be paid to overtures

Attention

being made by the South Asian Asso-

ciation for Regional Cooperation and the Pacific Forum.

\tJith

adequate experience and credentials in appropriate specialization,
Thailand could qualify as efficient partner or collaborator in
fishing industries,
conservation

such as canning, cold storage

and fishery

and management to enhance potentials and enrich

fishing grounds in various zones.
(4)

For the government of Thailand, the internal problems

are manifold.

Unemployment of fishermen needs to be tackled.

Forward planning is needed in anticipation of eventual dislocation

27 I ...

of fishermen and the employees in the fishing industries.

Fisher-

men may have to find other employment or follow other pursuits.
Larger budget is needed to boost the Department of Fisheries
to meet new responsibilities for fisheries management,
information

gathering,

aquaculture

development and

scientific
enforcement.

The Government needs re-education through more and better scientific,
social and economic information

to formulate a balanced plan

for the future of Thai fisheries.
(5)

In anticipation of Thailand's ratification of the 1982

LOS Convention,

32]

a series of legislative acts will be need-

ed either in the form of general enabling act or specialized
fields of legislation including detailed ministerial regulations,
to implement

the 1981 E.E.Z. proclamation by Thailand.

:Fisheries Legislation

1

The

of 1947 needs revision and restructuring.

In this particular connexion, the Asian African Legal Consultative
Committee,

of which Thailand has been active member since 1961,

should be closely consulted,

in order to adopt timely and appro-

priate measures in harmonious coordination and cooperation with
other coastal countries with the larger regions of Asia and Africa,
without overlooking

the legislative measures by other coastal

States in the North and South as well as East Pacific regions.
The European Community also provides excellent models for legislation
in regard to the E.E.Z., Community as

~rmll

as individual member

State of the Community. 331

28i . ..
32]

For an opinion in support of Thailand's ratification of
the Convention, see, e.g., Ted. L. Mcdorman,
"Thailand
and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention",
Marine Policy
9 (1985).

33]

See, e.g., the fisheries arrangement between Spain and
France and the friction that followed between Spaniards
and French fisherm~n.
See also Haruhiro Fukui, "How Japan
Handled UNCLOS Issues : Does Japan Have an Ocean Policy?"
in R. L. Friedheim, Japan and the N8w Ocean Regime, Boulder,
Colo., Westview Press, 1984, pp. 45 et seq.
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III.

1.

TRANSIT PASSAGE

TRADITIONAL STAND OF THAILAND ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
AND TRANSIT PASSAGE
If, as has been seen,

Thailand's contribution to the

three Conferences on the Law of the Sea and even in the preparation
of draft articles is not negligible,

it must be added that Thai-

land's positions regarding freedom of navigation and the right
of transit passage must have been clear to historians

from

Grotian time.

In the wake of the theoretical debates between

Hugo Grotius'

''!."1are Liberum" and Lord Seldon's "Mare Clausum",

Thailand appears to have opted for freedom of the high seas,
freedom of navigation, free flow of commerce and the right of
free passage through territorial waters and international waterways.

The Treaty between Thailand and the Netherlands of June

12, 1617, 34]

facilitating commercial exchanges between the

two countries testifies to

Thailand's stand in favour of freedom

of commerce and navigation.
The right of transit passage, as recently developed
and endorsed in the LOS Convention Package, is something relatively
new and is not automatically accorded or available to those remaining outside the new regime of ocean law. It does contain a novel
element that is significant and vital to the
and national security of all nations,

strategic position

large and small, rich and

poor, coastal and land-locked alike.

29/ ...

. .·,,
'
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34]

See, e.g., G.W. Gong, "The Standard of 'Civilization' in
International Society", Oxford, 1984, especially at p.
203.
See also Sumet Jumsai,
"The First Siamese Embassy
in Europe",
the Voice of the Nation, Bangkok, February
17,

I974,

p.4.
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A balanced approach to this important notion of "transit
passage" requires a basic comprehension of allied notions which
have to be frontally faced.
the different

r~gimes

Without an exhaustive analysis of

of various portions of the sea or ocean,

such as the high seas, the territorial seas, the archipelagic
waters, archipelagic sea lanes, international straits and E.E.Z.s,
an understanding of some basic concepts is essential to any introduction to this delicate and controversial subject of "TRANSIT
PASSAGE". These notions include "passage'',

"trasit passage",

"innocent passage" and "archipelagic sea lane passage" as well
as in terms of jural relationship , viz.,
"right of transit passage",

the ''right of passage'',

''right of innocent passage" and "right

of archipelagic sea lane passage".
a.

Different Types of Passage
1.

"Passage"

jn the context of the Convention on the

Territorial Sea and the

Contiguous Zone, 1958, means navigation

through the territorial sea for the purpose either of traversing
through that sea without entering international waters, or of
proceeding to international waters, or of making for the high
seas from internal waters.

35]

This definition is reiterated

in Article 18 (1) of the 1982 Convention.
18 clarifies

Paragraph 2 of Article

this definition further by requiring passage to

be "continuous and expeditions". However, passage may include
"stopping and anchoring",

but only

''in so far as the same are

incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by
force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance
to persons, ships or aircrafts in danger or distress." 36]
30/ ...

35]

See Article 14
the Territorial
The Work of the
U.N .. New York,

(2) and (3) of the Geneva Convention on
Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958;
International Law Commission, Third Edition,
1980, pp. 140-147.

36]

See Article 18 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 1982, U.N. Publication, New York, 1983, at p.18.
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Freedom of the high seas, on the other hand,
more comprehensive than the right of passage.
inter alia,

freedom of navigation,

is much

It comprises

freedom of fishing,

freedom

to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and freedom to overfly
the high seas.
2.

37]

"Transit passage"

transit passage)

means, under Article 38 (Right

of the 1982 LOS Convention,

of

"the exercise

in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and
overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious
transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone

and another part of the high seas or

an exclusive economic zone.
nuous and expeditious

However,

the requirement of conti-

transit does not preclude passage through

the strait for the purpose of entering,
from

leaving or returning

a State bordering a strait, subject to the condition of

entry to that State."
3.

38]

"Innocent passage",

under Article 14 of the Geneva

Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone

of 1958. means

any passage "so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order and security of the coastal State

'and such passge' shall

take place in conformity with these articles and with other rules
of international lat.:J. ''

39]

Under Article 19 of LOS Convention
31/ ...

37]

See Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
April 29, 1958, the Work of the International Law Commission,
Third Edition, U.N., New York, 1980, pp. 147-155, at p.
147.
Compare Article 87 (Freedom of the High Seas) of the
1982 LOS Convention, U.N. Publication,
New York, 1983
at pp. 30-31.

38]

See Article 38 (2),
39-44, pp. 12-14 ..

39]

See Article 14 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958, referred to in Note 32 supra.

ibid., at p. 12.

See also Articles

19R2, t:he concept of ''innocent passage'' which is further amplified
is applicable in the context of the territorial sea,
Section 3, as well as Part III, Section 3,

Part II,

Strait used for interr~gime

national navigation, excluded from the application of the

of transit passage under Article 38 (1), or between a part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial
sea of a foreign State.

This "innocent passage'' is also

40]

applicable through archipelagic waters under Article 52 of the
1982 Convention. 41]
4.

"Archipelagic sea lanes passage"

53 (3) of the 1982 Convention,

42]

means, under Article

"The exercise in accordance

with this Convention of the rights of navigation
in the normal mode

and overflight

solely for the purpose of continuous, expedit-

ions and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone.

,,

Paragraphs 4 and 5 prescribe

further requirements for the archipelagic sea lanes passage which
~shall

traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial

sea and shall include all normal passage routes used as routes
for international navigation or overflight through or over
archipelagic waters and, within such routes, so far as ships
are concerned, all normal navigational channels,

provided that

duplication of routes of similar convenience between the same
entry and exit points shall not be necessary." 43]
lanes

and air routes shall be defined as a

Such sea

series

of conti-

nuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the
exit points.

Ships and aircrafts in archipelagic sea lanes passage
32/ ...

40]

See Article 19 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea,
1982, cited in Note 33, at pp. 6-7.

41 J

See Article 53, ibid . .

42]

Ibid.,

43]

Ibid., Article 53 (4) at p. 17.

,J

:1

p.

p.

17.

17.
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shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side
of such axis lines
and aircraft

during passage,

provided that such ships

shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10

per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands
bordering the sea lane.

44]

Traffic separation schemes may

also be prescribed for the safe passage of ships through narrow
channels in such sea lanes.
b.

45]

Variety of rights of passage
Following the preceding

types of passage,

description of the different

it may be convenient to examine the variety

of rights relating to the different types of passage outlined.
1.

The "right of passage", for example,

must be viewed

as the most extensive right incidental to freedom of navigation.
It is not confined to any sea lanes or routes or subjected to
any traffic separation schemes, being one of the freedoms of
the high seas.

In the narrower context of the territorial sea,

however, the passage has of
2.

nccessi ty

The "right of transit passage"

to be ''innocent".
through straits is the

creation of a new r§gime in modern ocean law, applicable to
''straits used for international navigation".

It restricts the

freedom of navigation or overflight to the sole purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part
33/ ...

44]

Ibid.,

Article 53 (5) at p. 17.

45]

Ibid., Article 53 (6) at p. 17;
compare Article 41 (Sea
Janes and traffic separation schemes in straits used for
international navigation), paras 1-7.

SUCHARITKUL/33

of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.

3. The ''right of transit Eassage" through archipelagic
waters is somewhat larger and more flexible than through a strait
used for international navigation.
There is room for deviation
within the 25 miles range of the archipelagic sea lanes and air
routes and the sole purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit is further tightened by the requirement of
non-obstruction by the archipelagic State.
4.

The ''right of innocent passage" is better knovm and

more traditional in the sense that it has to some extent been
established in the practice of States, as confirmed in no uncertain
terms,

in the Corfu Channel Case (1949) 46].

Controversy persists

nonetheless as regards the requirements of ''innocence'' or "innocent
character'' of the passage.
This has been further clarified by
Article 19 of the LOS Convention of 1982
47] by way of general
description of an innocent passage plus an enumeration
cumstances precluding the innocence of the passage.

of cir-

The right

of passage through such waters as the territorial waters of a
coastal State or an international strait excluded from the application of the regime of transit passage under Article 38 (1). or
between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and the territorial sea
by the requirement

of a foreign State, is therefore restricted

of the passage being

"innocent" within the
34/ ...

46]

See U.K. v. Albania, Corfu Channel Case (Merits) l.C.J.
Repo~1949, pp. 4 et seq., the right of passage is recognized for peace time "provided' the passage is innocent".

47]

See Article 19 of the LOS Convention 1982, U.N.
1983, at pp. 6-7.
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meaning of Article 19.

48]

Without at this stage conjecturing

the extent or limits of this right of innocent passage, it is
necessary to underline the compromise nature of the formula adopted,
which, not unlike other compromises, is susceptible of differing
interpretation to be acceptable to all States, or at least to
generate general acquiescence

if not consensus.
35/ ...

48]

Under Article 19 (1),
"passage is innocent as long as
it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State.
Such passage shall take place in
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of
international law."
"Passage of a foreign ship shall
be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State it in the territorial
sea it engages in any of the following activities :
(a)

(qJ

any threat or use of force against
territorial integrity or political
the coastal State, or in any other
of the principles of international
the Charter of the United Nations;

the sovereignty,
independence of
manner in violation
law embodied in

_any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;

(c)

any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice
of the defence or security of the coastal State;

(d)

any act of propaganda aim~d at affecting the defence
or security of the coastal State;

(e)

the launching,

(f)

the launching, landing or taking on board of any
military device;

(g)

the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency
or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal States;

(h)

any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to
this Convention;

(i)

any fishing activities;

landing or taking on board of any aircraft;

(to be continued . .. )

2.

PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IDENTIFIED
Several questions of fundamental importane have been raised

in connexion with the right of transit passage through straits
used for international navigation.

The first question that stands

out is the division of international straits that permit of transit
passage and those that would allow only innocent passage in the
same way as a passage through the territorial water of another
State.
The second basic question of legal and stategic significance
is the differences between the right of transit passage and its
applicability on the one hand and the very restricted right of
innocent passage on the other.
The third question relates to the rights of men-of-war
or

war~ships

in time of peace to pass through international straits.

Can a man-of-war exercise the right of transit passage through
international straits open for ordinary vessels of commerce with
their right of transit passage?

Ultimately, can a warship ever

exercise the right of innocent passage in peace time without
being in one way or another prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State?

Only activities having a

direct bearing on passage, such as uninterrupted and undelayed
36/ ...

48] (cont.)
(j)

the carrying out of research or survey activities;

(k)

any act aimed at interfering with any systems of
communication or any other facilities or installations
of the coastal State;

(1)

any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage."
(para 2).
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navigation or continuous and expeditious voyage would not be
considered to be "not innocent". Fishing, collecting scientific
data, exploring, mine-sweeping, naval exercise, radio transmission jamming, testing, training,

loading or unloading,

launching any aircraft or object would render the passage of
a

ship

"not innocent"

the vessel,

in spite of the peaceful character of

be it private ;merchantman or government ship

other than a man-of-war.
The positons of States regarding these questions are necessarily varied.

The Super Powers and other traditionally maritime

powers would insist on freedom of transit passage through an
international strait,

however defined in order to ensure their

"presence'' throughout the

world in time of crisis.

Coastal

States with less effective means of self-defence would prefer
to have their security safeguarded by absence of the show
forces,

sea and air power,

appear to conflict inter se.

of the stronger States.

of

Their interests

There appears to exist also a

third group of States which may need the assistance of their
allies in time of emergency, hence the need to support freedom
of transit" p~~sage.
On the other hand, this freedom should be
sufficiently restricted to permit the coastal States or strait
States adequate control of movement of hostile vessels through
their territorial waters or the straits they border.

A compromise

has had to be struck and it has to be sufficiently controversial
to allow for differences in interpretation and implementation.
Resulting conflicts could be resolved through the various pacific
means of dispute settlement to be worked out in State practice.

37 I ...
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3.

THAILAND'S POSITION ON TRANSIT PASSAGE
To assess Thailand's position on the right of transit passage

is an interesting challenge.

Different aspects of the question

need to be examined with the greatest care.
(a)

General Principles

Thailand's policies are conditioned by certain considerations
and constraints.
cannot deviate.

There are some principles from which Thailand
She must continue to support freedom of navigation,

having regard to her liberal trade policies and the right to fish
in as wide an ocean space as could be allocated.

Thailand's

strong opposition to "mare clausum" jn the context of fisheries
is too well known to need any elaboration at this point.
Freedom of navigation and other freedom of the high seas
have not embittered Thailand's experience with western expansionism
to the point of losing her national independence and territorial
integrity.

The gunboat diplomacy of the West was intolerable

but it was endured with untold hardship.

But past is past.

The present posture of Thailand continues to be supportive of
freedom of navigation,

hence relatively free transit passage

through international straits

for her own fishing vessels,

merchant marine and also naval forces.
In the world of inter-dependence, mutual
indispensable.
and allies.

assistance is

Thailand stands in need of help from her friends

Freedom of transit passage may provide a key to

her defence and survival in terms of logistic support and other
forms of subsistence assistance.
38/ ...
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(b)

Geographical or geopolitical considerations

"Transit passage'' is a plus for Thailand from the point
of view of her geographical situation and geopolitical position.
Thailand's peninsular portion in the South serves to separate
her defence fleets into two, one for the Gulf of Thailand and
another, perhaps less important, for the Anderman Sea, and
Ocean.

Divided in fact by the Malacca straits,

Indian

Thai fleets

of all types, whether fishing, commercial or governmental vessels,
cannot readily service both sides of the Southern panhandle bordered by the Gulf of Thailand to the East and the Anderman Sea to
the West.
Besides, given the definition of

''passage" through territorial

water , there is little chance of a hostile vessel exercising
any right of transit or indeed innocent passage through Thailand's
territorial water .

It is essentially, therefore,

in Thailand's

national self-interest to protect the right of transit passage
as well as innocent passage for all practical purposes for all
Thai flags.

Thailand stands to gain more than lose on the general

application of the right of "transit passage".

(c)

Thailand's positions

In the ultimate analysis, national self-interests, immediate,
intermediate or long-term,
Thailand policies.

cannot per se conclusively determine

Taking into account the principal role initially

played by Thailand in ASEAN,

Thailand cannot afford to turn

deaf ears to the pleadings of her close associates and
neighbours.

friendliest

The position of ASEAN cannot be said to be uniform

in this particular connexion.

While the Philippines and Indonesia

would prefer to" restrict "transit passage"

as much as possible,

thus, allowing the coastal States, or archipelagic States or
indeed strait States, to exercise effective control over the
39/ ...

~:JCHAHi TKUL/

3 1:/

passage of foreign vessels of all denominations, especially warships
which should seek prior authorization before commencing any transit
passage.

Malaysia is also inclined in this direction although

she has been less vocal.

On the other hand, Singapore, albeit

a riparian of the Malacca Strait, and hence further bound by
a stronger sense of solidarity to

support the majority in the

Malacca Strait, is clearly concerned with its own freedom of
navigation and transit passage not only

for its own flags but

more precisely also for international commerce and navigation,
being dependent, although to a diminishing degree,
trade.

Traffic

on the entrep6t

separation schemes approved by the I.M.O.

(Intergovernmental Maritime Organization) appear to provide the
much needed balance to ensure Singapore's positive stand in favour
of transit passage guaranteed by safety of navigation.

Thailand's

position within ASEAN is unique in that unlike the Philippines
which is an archipelagic State and further away from Malacca
Strait,
State.

Thailand is virtually the opposite of an archipelagic
Her southern isthmus separates two seas, and therefore

two fleets.

Furthermore, she is immediately opposite to India

and Indonesia and adjacent to Malaysia.
In the circumstances,

Thailand is obliged to keep a low

profile, fully cognizant of her national interests in regard
to the right of transit passage while not unmindful of the vital
interests of her ASEAN friends and associates.

She also has

to take into consideration her own security interests which may
be linked to other overseas friendly powers beyond ASEAN and
Southeast Asia.

Thailand must go along with whatever compromise

has been reached, after trying her hardest to have her interests
adequately reflected and protected, by making

certain that her

fleets are not permanently separated and friendly assistanace
from overseas is not precluded by non-application of transit
passage for military or other assistance in time of need.
40/ ...

IV.

1.

DISPUTES SETTLEMENT

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
(a) General Policies and Guidelines
"AROKA PARAMA LABHA".

prevention of illness is best.

However

potent may be the cure

The Thais, like many other Buddhists

in Asia, remain firm believers in this philosophy. Orientals
share a natural aversion for litiqation in general and international adjudication in particular. 49]
Despite the numerous variations of pacific methods of
dispute settlement or conflict

resolution~

including the principal

means mentioned in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations,
none seems in Thailand's bitter experience to have offered an
ideal solution to the problem of conflict resolution.
Thailand is convinced that it is far better to prevent
conflict, to avoid the causes of conflict and to pre-empt any
potential dispute from arising, than to allow

an internatinal

difference to grow into a conflict or dispute between nations
requiring delicate and ceaseless attention.
As Thailand can afford neither the time nor the expenses
for international adjudication or other
_.-,

party dispute settlement,

l~sser

forms of third-

the first priority for Thailand is

to avoid friction or potential dispute at all costs.

41/ ...
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"Robbery leaves something.
Compare the Chinese saying
Fire does not consume land.
A law-suit is worse than
robbery and fire combined.n
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(b)

Anticipation and identification

of problem areas

Thailand's best insurance against risks of conflict in
the context of the new law of the sea lies in her ability to
anticipate problem areas where conflicts are likeliest.
abundantly

It is

clear that the new ocean law is opening new possi-

bilities for the exploration and exploitation of all living and
non-living resources of the sea, the sea-bed,

ocean floor and

mineral resources underneath.
Apart from fisheries conservation and management which,
as noted in Section II

50] 1 may require attention in areas beyond

national jurisdiction,

the exploration and exploitation of living

and non-living resources of the ocean depends

on the national

confines of a State. The problem of delimitation
boundaries is inevitable, vis-a-vis, opposite

of maritime

and adjacent States,

both with regard to water-column and the continental shelves
and subsoil.

New areas require new delimitation, partially uni-

laterally to some extent such as the drawing of straight baselines,
partially with the common heritage of mankind,

separating the

E.E.Z.s from the high seas or areas beyond 200 miles, and the
continental shelves within the 200 miles as well as the extension

of

the continental margin for up to 350 miles measured from the

base-lines.
Such unilateral measures are not necessarily binding
unless acquiesced in by other interested States.

Absence of

protest or objection may indicate some certainty in such actions.

42/ ...
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50]

Section II, The Exclusive Economic Zone,

pp.~~~lsupra.
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Other types of delimitation involving the marking of a
frontier line dividing adjacent States or opposite States obviously
requires the agreement or
parties,
(c)

in regard,

concurrence of the other party or indeed

for instance,

to a tri-junction.

Thailand's preventive or pre-emptive measures

It is Thailand's conviction that pre-emption is better
than remedial or curative effort.

Thus,

long before the signing

of the LOS Convention on December 10, 1982,

Thailand had embarked

on the negotiations of a series of bilateral treaties to delimit
her maritime boundaries with her most immediately adjacent neighbours,

including Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia and India.

Kampuchea

did reach a draft agreement before it was overtaken by an upheaval
which put the clock back for that unfortunate country.
also endeavoured to reach

Vietnam

agreement with some of its neighbours,

but so far yielding little results, owing
theory of the deepest channel or

thalweg,

to its somewhat unusual
an analogy derived

from the law of international rivers.
Anxious to settle the delimitation question with all her
neighbours,

Thailand must be seen as very willing and generous

in making concessions to India, Burma and Indonesia without much
bargaining.

Thailand must have appeared to be the most agreeable

and easiest to negotiate partners.

What is imporwntr is the

certainty of the delimitation agreed upon by the parties. Whatever
the principle preferred or adopted,
other geographical or geometrical
or median line,

equitable principles or
techniques such as equidistance

as long as the results are equitable and agreeable,

Thailand will accept and honour.
was concluded in record time.

Thus the agreement with India

The Thai-Burmese maritime boundary

was based on quasi or approximate

equidlstance~

principle.

The

Thai side approved Burmese line more than once without quibbling.
The tri-junction, Thai-India-Indonesia, was the first to be
established in the sub-region.
43/ ...
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The problem with Malaysia was more difficult.

It concerned

an area in the Gulf of Thailand. because of the existence of
many special circumstances, including the presence of an island
and shifting sand at

mouth of the Golok boundary river.
The good will of both Parties, backed by genuine conviction in
the principle of good neighbourliness.
led the leaders of the
th~

two Southeast Asian ASEAN Kingdoms to overcome what had appeared
to be insuperable difficulties and conclude an agreement which
was durable enough to ensure timely exploration and exploitation
of all mineral resources in the area in question, designated
under the agreement as the "Joint Development Area".
of great legal,

Problems

political and economic significance have been

resolved, and there are many more to be overcome
implementation and administration.
Thailand authority

in the actual

The creation of a joint Malaysia-

is the establishment of an international

organization to administer the joint development area,

applying

a regime and a development law which is neither Thai nor Malaysian.
Once the two Parties could reach agreement,
interested in the joint-development area

private sectors

also have to renegotiate

since the original concession agreements were without exception
applicable to areas already delimited.
tation,

In the absence of delimi-

a new regime will have to be introduced and accepted

by all concerned.

It may take further negotiations, but one

thing is clear, Thailand and Malaysia could agree on the joint
exploration and exploitation of resources in the area.

(d)

Obstacles to overcome

Negotiation is an art that requires both knowledge and
skills,

knowledge of what constitute the national interests

at stake and their priority, and the skill to persuade the copartner to accept the wisdom of a mutually beneficial agreement .
.. . !
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Far-sightedness and insight are difficult to learn.

i

The ability

to estimate the level of the bottom line and to calculate the
econometrics or each step of the bargain,
weighe~

and disadvantages to be carefully

including the advantages
is only acquired after

long experience.
Understanding and appreciation of each other's position
and difficulties must be learned by negotiators.

Thailand has

been successful in several negotiations and also unsuccessful
in several

.others which required subsequent efforts and for-

bearance to rectify the situation.

The Special Yen Agreement

may be given as one such example of protracted renegotiation.
Clearly Thailand is more or less experienced compared to some
of her Asian colleagues.

The art

of negotiation can be learned

and passed on from school to school, from generation to generation.
A thorough understanding of the
successful negotiations.

subject~matter

Of late,

have become a permanent feature
meetings.
a

is essential to

multilateral negotiations

in international relations and

Legal knowledge and linguistic

long way towards the making of a sound

abilities will go
negotiator.

There

is no substitute for intelligence, far-sightedness and sincerity.
The Japanese experience has been systematic, progressive and
fully disciplined.

2.

AVAILABLE OPTIONS
Among the alternative methods of dispute settlement

should be mentioned

negotiation,

good offices, commission

of

enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.

It might be pertinent to examine some of these pacific

means of conflict resolution in the light of Thailand's recent
experience, excluding the imposition

of unequal treaties and

the untiring efforts of Thailand to negotiate their elimination.50]
45/ ...
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This episode deserves a separate treatment by itself.
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(a)

Negotiation

and

renegotiatio~

As is shown in the preceding subsection,

negotiation

is a means to reach agreement between States and also to avoid
or pre-empt future conflicts.

Thus, a well thought out agreement

is not likely to generate disputes.

Should a dispute arise,

however, from a negotiated arrangement,

then the most natural

and immediate way to deal with the situation is direct negotiation
or renegotiation between the original parties involved.
Even where a dispute arises out of a situation and not
from an agreement,

negotiation affords the first and foremost

logical means to air the difference with the view to resolving
whatever conflict that may persist.
as the case may be.

Negotiation, or renegotiation

is therefore the very first attempt at conflict

resolution or dispute settlement.
It is sometimes said that not everything is negotiable.
Thus, neither peace, nor sovereignty nor political independence
of a State would seem negotiable. 51]

It should also be added

that many other things are negotiable, and disputes can be successfully negotiatd to the mutual satisfaction of both or all parties
involved.
"Renegotiation"

has been employed as a means to reschedule

international debts in the case of a state of necessity. Thailand
has had to renegotiate out of a status of unequal treaties like
other Asian nations under a

r~gime

of extra-territoriality

such as China, Japan and Turkey.

46/ ...
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For example, in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
dispute
between Argentina and the United Kingdom, there seem to
be . non-negotiable issues.
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In the context of ocean law,

Thailand has had to negotiate

with everyone of her neighbours to delimit her maritime boundary,
primarily the continental shelf and eventually also the E.E.Z.
Further negotiations, such as with Vietnam, remain to be undertaken in due course and with utmost care and vigilance.
Fishery agreements both at governmental level and joint
venture agreements have had to be negotiated and continue to be
an item for further negotiation

or renegotiation in several

areas of interests to fishing nations and coastal States.
The consideratins that apply to negotiation to avoid and
pre-empt conflict equally apply to negotiations to resolve existing
dispute or conflict that has resulted.

Thailand has had her

share of satisfaction and disappointment,

of success and failure,

both bilaterally and multilaterally.
(b)

Good offices

Once negotiation or renegotiation fails to produce agreed
results,

other means at the disposal of the Parties must be

examined and employed if at all practicable.

"Good offices"

appear to be the most palatable or the least objectionable
among the means of third-party dispute settlement.
negotiation,

"good offices'' afford a

conveni~nt

Next to

means to resolve

a conflict with the assistance or rather with a "passive" attendance

by a third party, providing the good offices, without assert-

ing any views on the substance of the dispute.
In her recent practice,

Thailand has found this method

to be the least burdensome if not indeed the most acceptable
of all the methods of third-party conflict resolution.
The party
providing the ''good offices'' remains a silent observer in the
47 I ...
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process of negotiation between the parties in dispute.

"Good

offices'' include every possible facility to induce the parties
to a negotiating table.

Such facilities include not only

accommodation, meeting room,

translation services and precis-

writers, but also other amenities to allow free and frank exchanges of views between the parties.

It does not preclude an independent

opinion, now and then, of a procedural nature or explanation
of implications under the established practice of the United
Nations, for instance,

in the case of the "good offices" provided

by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold

in disputes between Thailand

and Kampuchea in 1960 which culminated in the conclusion of
four sets of exchange of letters between the Parties in the presence
of the Secretary-General and his deputy, Ambassador Engers of
Norway.
"Good offices" of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations have been employed by Thailand and Kampuchea in subsequent
dispute or situation which requires the presence of an independent
observer representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
such as Ambassador

Bo de Ribbing

Thailand, in turn,

of Sweden.

has provided the much needed good

offices which contributed to the successful resolution of the
"CONFRONTATIE"

between Indonesia and Malaysia in the mid sixties,

and between the Philippines and Malaysia immediately after the
creation of Malaysia

including Sabbah in 1963.

In this tri-

angular conflict, Thailand presented herself as a
Party, with Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman,

disinterested

commandin~

and confidence of the three Parties in question.

the respect

Minister Khoman's

good offices restored law and order in Southeast Asia and paved
the way for the next phase of regional cooperation, the establishment of ASEAN.
48/ ...
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For Thailand,

"good offices" are welcome and much encouraged,

especially for resolution of regional or sub-r·egional conflicts.
(c)

Commission of enquiry

Under this heading may be included among the pacific means
of conflict resolution the establishment of a "commission of
enquiry" or a "fact-finding commission"

or ''committee" or simply

"verification team'' to ascertain, . establish or verify the existence
of

certain facts or situation.

Thus, a

"fact-finding commission"

was established to find facts regarding the practice of genocide
in Kampuchea after the fall of Longnol

and the establishment

of Democratic Kampuchea under Polpot in 1975.
enquiry"

or

"Commission of

"fact-finding commission" whose task it is to ascertain

and report on actual situation has often been used by an international organization such as the United Nations. On a smaller
scale,

a "verification team" may be set up to verify or confirm,

say the withdrawal of a number of guerillas despatched across
the border.

Thus, Thailand was asked to send a "verification

team" to verify and certify the withdrawal of Indonesian troops
from various points in Sarawak,

Malaysia,

during the height

of .the "Confrontatie" between Indonesia and Malaysia in 19641965.
(d)

Mediation

''Mediation" has not always been a happy medium to reach
a satisfactory

solution to any international conflict.In one

instance, Count Bernadette, a mediator for the Palestinian coflict
lost his life to an assasin.

Secretary-General Dag Hammaskjold

himself met with a tragic accident in
a fact-finding nature.
is a method to avoid.

Africa on a mission of

As far as Thailand is concerned, mediation
Japan mediated the dispute between Thailand

and France, resulting in the Tokyo Convention of May 9,

49/ ...
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before the outbreak of the Pacific war.

Thailand signed an agree-

ment with the Vichy Government only partially restoring portions
of territories earlier ceded

1904 and 1907 Treaties,

to France by Thailand under the

while Japan, acting as mediator,

over the rest of French Indochina.
story of

TA IN and TA NA,

took

Mediation reminds us of the

fighting over the fish, disagreeing

as to which half should belong to whom, while TA YU, the mediator,
took the body, giving the head of the fish to one party and the
tail to another.
(e)

Conciliation

Conciliation is another method of pacific settlement of
dispute through conciliation procedure,

generally each Party

nominating one member to serve on the three or five member
commission nominated from a panel of international jurists of
recognized competence,

such as members of the Permanent Court

of Arbitration at The Hague.
Thailand has had one experience in a territorial dispute
with France following the Settlement Accord of Washington of
November 17, 1946,

52) establishing a five-member Conciliation
Commission under Article XXI of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of

December 7, 1937.

This was all in accordance with the General

Act of Geneva of September 26, 1926 53]

for the Pacific Settle-

ment of International Disputes.
Thailand nominated one expert to the Commission chaired
by Ambassador Belaunde

of Peru.

The Conciliation Commission \-Jas
50/ ...

52]

See Article III of the Washington Accord 1946, 344 UNTS
59, No. 4943, and exchange of letters.

53]

See LNTS Vol.

93, p. 343, and Vol.

197, p. 304.
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heavily lopsided to begin with in favour of France, as a Latin
and Roman Catholic culture.
every imaginable argument
including ethnic,

Counsel for Thailand induced almost
for the return of lost territories,

linguistic and cultural affinities.

The Commission

recommended in favour of France, basing its reasoning on political
and legal considerations, especially applying under the law of
treaties,

inter alia,

the principle

Thailand was disappointed.
''

"Pacta sunt servanda".

Once bitten, she became shy and more

careful of western procedures of pacific settlement of dispute.
Of late, however, conciliation commission of a kind has
been reintroducted for compulsory settlement of legal and political
disputes with binding effect within the framework of ASEAN.

Each

member is to designate a minister to serve on the conciliation
commission.

54]

There is thus far no recorded hearing or

recommendation on any dispute or question.
Conciliation commission has also been adopted in the latest
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations
and betweeninternational Organizations, 1986, 55]
procedure for settlement of
of "jus cogens". In a way

as a compulsory

disputes concerning the application
the procedure for compulsory arbitration

is combined with compulsory conciliation, and arbitrators/conciliators are persons of recognized competence in international
law.

51/ ...
54]

See, e.g., C. Quisumbing, "Problem and Prospects of ASEAN
Law : Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Dispute
Settlement",
ASEAN ldenity Development and Culture,
Honolulu,
East West Centre,
Cultural Learning Institute,
1981, p. 300.

55]

See the relevant articles 53 and 64 on Jus Cogens of the
1986 Convention, not yet entered into force.

SUCH.Z\RITKUL/51

(f)

Arbitration

Many types of international arbitration are possible,
as between States,
awards,

some with compulsory procedure and binding

others within the framework of an established arbitral

tribunal, or the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague,
or ad hoc tribunal.

or sole arbitrator.

Commercial arbitration in the context of internaional
trade lies outside the scope of the present

introduction, but

international arbitration involving government contracts or concessions,

or the type of ICSID convention arbitration,

between

States and private enterprises in connection with development
investments may be of some interest.

Thailand has recently signed

the ICSID Convention which awaits ratification before entry into
force for Thailand.

Her internal law and procedures allowing

international arbitration will

have to be amended or readjusted.

Recently, Thailand was party to a dispute which was brought
before an arbitral tribunal in Zurich by Union Oil Co.

(1986) 56]

concerning royalties assessment.
(g)

Judicial Settlement

Thailand was among the very few Asian nations that attended
the First and Second Peace Conferences at The Hague in 1899 and
1907, and subscribed to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, whose
panel of arbitrators nominate

candidates for judges in the

Permanent Court of International Justice and since 1945 the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
member of the

Thailand was an original

Statute of the Permanent Court but did not become

party to the Statute of the International Court until 1946, a
year since its existence and operation.

52/ ...
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July 2-4, 1986, Zurich.
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Thailand ranks among important nations which have suffered
some disappointments at the hands of the highest judicial instance
for pacific settlement of international disputes.

The United

Kingdom was not particularly pleased with the decisions of the
Court in the Anglo Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 195152

57]

and the Anglo-Norv-Jegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norwuy)

1951. 58]

Nor was the United States especially enthusiastic

about a recent decision in Nicaragua v. U.S.A., 1986/ 59]

The

U.S. Government appears to have expressed the sentiment of disenchantment felt

by Thailand after the judgement in the Temple

of Phra Viharn Case,

1961-62.

60]

The darkest days of the

Court came upon its judgement in the South-West Africa Cases
~;I-

phase), 1966,61] _

~!;-

(second

andAhas encountered endless difficulties,

trying to recover from that case.

Both Thailand and the United

States declared their sense of disillusionment

by the decisions

of the Court which were believed to be due in no small measure
to the hazard of its composition at the material times, i.e.,
53/ ...

57]

U.K.

v. Iran, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, 1951-1952,

~J.

Reports 1951, p. 89.
(Interim Measures); I.C.J. Reports 1952, p.
(Pleliminary Objections).
v. Norway,

1951, I.C.J.

93 at p. 103,

58]

U.K.

Reports, p. 116.

59]

Nicaragua v. U.S.A.,

60]

Cambodia v. Thailand, 1961-1962, I.C.J. Keports 1961,
p.17 (Preliminary Objections), ibid., 1962.

61]

I.C.J. Reports 1960, p.6.

1986, June 1986,

I.C.J. Reports 1986.
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in 1962. and

in 1986 by the United States for diametrically

opposite reasons.

Thailand thought the Court was too European

and colonial in its approach to the law of treaties, especially
where treaties were induced by force while the United States
hinted that the Court was leaning
views of the Third World.

excessively towards non-European

The truth of the matter is that very

few States have been satisfied with the performance of the Court.
More recent cases have been frequently maritime delimitation
disputes, directly arising out of the new Law of the Sea.

It

should be noted that developed countries preferred arbitration
(e.g., U.K. v. France delimitation) or special chamber to select
their own judges (e.g., Canada v. U.S.A.). while countries from
the Third world, especially Africa and Latin America have sought
judicial settlement of their maritime boundary disputes by the
International Court of Justice.
The experience of Thailand has been one of bitter disappointment.

From the start, a mistake was made by the Secretary-

General of the United Nations in his note reminding Thailand
that her declaration made in 1939 to the Permanent Court which
the Secretary-General erroreously

believed was transferred to

the International Court of Justice in 1945 was about to expire
in 1949 and suggested that Thailand should renew that declaration,
which in fact

as well as in law lapsed in 1945.

62]

Unquestion-

ingly, Thailand without consulting the Cabinet, let alone seeking
parliamentary approval, filed a declaration renewing the old
declaration that had long lapsed, believing falsely with the
Secretary-General that it was still valid and unthinkingly that
54/ ...
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As was clearly demonstrated by the Agent for Israel in
the Bulgarian Aerial Incident Case,
Israel
1957, I.C.J. Reports 1957,
Pleadings.

v.

Bulgaria,
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it was the normal thing to do.

The facts of international

were far from Thailand's innocent and credulous

belief.

On the merits of the Temple Case. the Court erred

life
63]

in favour

of a colonial power by allowing acquisition of title against
the original holder,

not by usucapion nor by subsequent conduct,

and contrary to boundary treaty provisions, but, basing its decision
on the binding character of an erroneous French-made map which
was the source of publications and reproductions on papers without
actual possession on the ground. 64] The Court wrongly held Thailand's
silence to be acquiescence, while, in actual fact, Thailand had
always been in actual possession of the Temple without any protest
from France.

Does it mean then that territorial sovereignty

could be displaced by mere surreptitious publication

of a false

map or misleading or inaccurate docu.ment?
Since 1962, Thailand's disenchantment with judicial settlement of disputes prevented her from filing
under the optional clause.

any further declaration

This does not mean that Thailand

is necessarily averse to the Court or its compulsory jurisdiction.
In fact, the decision in the Temple Case was carried out under
strong reservation.
Serious objections were expressed through the
Thai Representative in the Sixth Committee in 1962.

Thailand's

acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has since
been on a selective. ad hoc or eclectic

basis, such as, in
55/ ...

63]

A young Director-General of the Department of United Nations
Affairs in Bangkok, bypassing the Legal Adviser's Office.
gave the view in 1949 that Thailand should of necessity
accept the optional clause like every body else. (sic.)

64]

The Temple Case (Merits) , I.C.J. Reports 1962, p.6. The
map was not an integral part of the Treaty of 1904. It
was made much later not strictly in conformity with the
relevant Treaty provisions.
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bilateral treaties on conditions of strict reciprocity and subject
to appropriate reservation or in multilateral conventions on
a special subject where compulsory jurisdiction is deemed to
be useful, practical and without discrimination or element of
surprise.

In principle,

adjudication.

Thailand does not object to compulsory

so long as she could choose her partners

or opponents

or the subject-matters of the dispute to be submitted for adjudication.
What is lacking in Thailand is perhaps not so much the
necessary brain-power

65]

as an adequate appreciation by the

Government of the role of international law and the necessity
to place the conduct of foreign relations and possibility of
dispute settlement on a sound basis of the law rather than on
superstitions or groundless suspicion or witchcraft.

The Government

must begin a process of self-education to accept the sound legal
advice of its own native experts and not readily and summarily
to dismiss as hostile any constructive suggestion
legal reasoning. 66]

based on sound

Legal expertise should be cultivated not

discouraged if a nation such as Thailand expects to survive in
this severely competitive world. 67]
56/ ...

65]

In fact, very few Thais have reached international recognition.
Only two in the span of a century were elected to the Institute
of International Law, the first one was originally a Belgian
national, Gustav Rolin Jacquemyne,
Chao Phya Abhai Raja.
Only one Thai
was invited to teach at the Hague
Academy of International Law at the regular session.
Only
two Thai
jurists were ever elected to serve on the International Law Commission of the United Nations.
One was
nevertheless the first Asian ever to be appointed Special
Rapporteur of the CommLSSion.

66]

In 1960, a young Thai jurist was nearly summarily executed
under Section 17 of the order of the Revolutionary Council
for contradicting an optimistic assessment that Thailand
had a 300 per cent chance of winning the Temple Case. Had
it not been for the shrewdness of Field Marshall Sarit
Dhanarajata
the Thai expert would have long perished
before his attaining international recognition.

67]

Thailand never had a Judge on an International Court inspite
of the existence of a number of her most highly qualified
publicists. Indeed, no other nation in the world instructed
its representative to dissuade its allies from voti119 for
its national candidate. even if it was just an election
fn f i l l
in a casual vacancy.
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3.

NEW DISPUTES SETTLEMENT MACHINERIES AND THAILAND'S REACTIONS
(a) New options open by the Convention of 1982
Under the LOS Convention 1982,

new procedures and new

mechanisms are being set up to facilitate still further the solution
to the problem of dispute settlement in the context of the new
Ocean Law.

There appears to be a proliferation

of judicial

machineries with adjudicative functions to determine
of law and of fact relating to matters falling
of the new ocean law.

questions

within the scope

Parties to a dispute have much wider

options than ever before.

There is truly an ''embarras de choix"

of different procedures for compulsory dispute settlement including
compulsory arbitration,

compulsory conciliation

and

compul-

sory adjudicative jurisdiction by one of the special tribunals
or chambers in addition to, and intentionally or otherwise,

in

competition with existing machineries including the Permanent
Court of~rbitration and the International Court of Justice with
its new streamlined procedures for special chamber.
also options for non-compulsory procedures available,
conciliation

and fact-finding commission.

There are
such as

The compulsory pro-

cedures may also entail binding decisions.
Thus,

in addition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration

at The Hague, and the International Court of Justice which continue
to be available to settle all legal disputes between the Parties,
the following new procedures and machineries are envisaged upon
entry into force of the LOS Convention of 1982.
(1)

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
The proposal

to establish an international tribunal for

the law of the sea has been well received without much opposition
although with some reservation.

The duplication and proliferation

of judicial institutions with overlapping functions are intended
to provide further options and to allow the law progressively
57 I ...
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to be developed within the framework of its particular specialisations.
The new tribunal is characterized by its administrative rather
than purely legal approach.

Besides the Parties to a conflict

may include subjects of international law other than States,
such as international organizations,

public and juridical persons

could have their disputes settled by the international tribunal
for the law of the sea.
(2) The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber
This special chamber is provided by Article 187 (Part
XI) of the Convention with jurisdiction to entertain and decide
disputes in regard to activities in the area under the administration of the Sea-Bed Authority covering

six categories of

disputes between State Parties or between a State Party and the
Authority or between Parties to a contract, or between a prospective
contractor and the Authority, or between States Parties, or,
the

Authority

or the Enterprise and natural or juridical persons.

Procedures for requesting advisory opinions are also open.
(.

Other

procedures such as an ad hoc Chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber and binding commercial arbitration are also available
under Article 188.
(3)

The Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII

of the Convention

Annex VII of the Convention provides for the establishment
of the Arbitral Tribunal designed to overcome some of the difficulties
encountered by existing international arbitral
is intended to furnish an improved model

to

tribunals.

It

facilitate arbitration.

Not unlike the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the
LOS Arbitral Tribunal is composed of a panel of arbitrators,
four from each member States, presumably the arbitrators are
qualified persons with experience in maritime affairs and enjoy
the highest reputation of fairness, competence and professional
integrity.

The arbitral awards are final and binding on the Parties.

58/ ...

SUCHARITKUL/58

Full compliance with the award by the Parties is assumed.
(4)

The Special Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VIII
A special arbitral tribunal may be established in accordance

with Annex VIII for one or more categories of the disputes specified
in that Annex for highly technical disputes envisaged in Article
287 (l)(d)

of the Convention.

Such special arbitral tribunal

can be constituted for the interpretation and application of
the articles
(i)

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

of the convention relating to :
fisheries;
protection and preservation of the marine environment;
marine scientific research; and
navigation,

including pollution from vessels

and by

dumping.

Special tribunals require experts, hence, a separate list
of experts on various subjects will be compiled and maintained
by the respective agencies such as the FAO, UNEP, Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission, IMO and their subsidiary bodies.

(b)

Thailand's Positions

Thailand's reactions to the new paraphenalia and potentials
or possibilities for pacific settlement of ocean law disputes
are less than enthusiastic,
lection

bearing in mind her general predi-

and priority for prevention or pre-emption of disputes

from ever arising and her preference for negotiation and good
offices.
is

On the other hand, as a peace-loving nation,

opposed to the use of force

as an instrument of national

policy or a means to resolve conflicts.
the new compulsory

Thailand

It should be added that

procedures to be made available,

including

58/ ...
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the arbitral tribunal and special arbitral tribunal as well as
the new international tribunal for the law of the sea

will provide

new options that may be acceptable· in the ultimate analysis as
the very last resort,

having exhausted all other preferred methods

of conflict resolution.
The additional.available procedures are welcome provided
that no undue burderl is thereby created.

The choice for Thai-

land as a prospective Party to a dispute

in this context must

remain equally wide if not indeed wider and more flexible in
the light of the new ocean law and the proliferation of arbitral
and adjudicative bodies, new and current, with overlapping functions
to choose from.

In this respect, the Convention is a package

Hith a widening choice of procedures for compulsory settlement
of disputes to be opted by the Parties in advance or on an ad
hoc basis in the event

a

dispute has arisen.

package is not open to reservation,

Although the

it is open to declaration

regarding options.

V.
1.

MARINE POLLUTION

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION
OF l\1ARINE ENVIRONMENT
The problem of marine pollution is relatively of recent

occurrence.

The expanse of ocean space used to seem unlimited

and virtually untarnished by the amount of dumps and wastes introduced by man.

Of late, however, the situation appears to have

changed and the danger to the world ecology has become a living
reality, owing

to the accumulation

of industrial and nuclear

waste, chemical discharges and radio-active materials and fallouts
which have found their way into the ocean and the superjacent
atmosphere.

Even the ozone layer seems to have diminished in

intensity, threatening the health of man and other living creatures.
59/ ...
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(a)

Nuclear Fallouts

The testing of nuclear explosions in the Pacific by the
United States in 1954 causing death to one Japanese fisherman
and injury to several members of the Japanese fishing fleet in
the area and the inhabitants of the Rongelap Atoll owing to contamination beyond the radius

of the calculated warning zones.

The United States Government gave medical and other assistance
and paid compensation

ex gratia

to the injured parties.

68]

The United Kingdom also conducted nuclear tests on the high seas
near Christmas Island in the Pacific from 1956-58. 69]

These

tests were not then considered to be illegal, although during
the First Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 the
Soviet proposed to make nuclear testing on the high seas a violation of the Convention was not voted upon at Geneva.

70]

But

the matter was instead referred to the General Assembly for
"appropriate ation".

71]

In 1963, a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
60/ ...

68]

See generally 4 Whiteman 553 et seq.;
see also McDougal and Schiel, 64 Yale L.J. (1955), 648
(for the legality of the tests) and Margolis,
64 Yale
L. J. ( 1955), 629 (against their legality).

69]

See Hansard, H. C., Vo. 568, WrittenAnswers, cols. 2729, April 2, 1957.
In U.K.'s view,
it is impossible
to consider the question of stopping nuclear tests without
having regard to the wider problem of preventing war in
general, including of course nuclear war.

70]

4 Whiteman, 585-586, the U.S.S.R. conducted most of its
tests in Siberia, but some also in the Barents Sea, p.574.

71]

Resolution on Nuclear Tests on the High Seas, 1958, Sea
Conference Records, Vol. II, p. 24, p. 101 (text).
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72]

was signed and came into force,

with
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the strong implication

that nuclear tests are outlawed and therefore illegal in international law.

France did not sign the Test Ban Treaty and continu-

ed to conduct tests in the South Pacific in 1972 and 1973. Several
States protested France's tests which led to the Nuclear Tests
cases (1974)

brought by Australia and New Zealand. 73]

Court did not pronounce

upon

the legality of nuclear tests

over the ocean in the atmosphere.
court's list

The

The cases were taken off the

without a decision being taken on the merits when

France announced that she would not conduct further tests after

1973.

74]

It remains always questinable whether France's unilateral

declaration was binding on France, and if so, who would be entitled
to invoke

this declaration.

75]

61/ ...

72]

U.K.T.S. 3 (1964), Cmnd.2245; 480 U.N.T.S. 43. In force
1963. 111 Contracting parties as of June 30, 1982, including the U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

73]

I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253 (Australia v. France), ibid.,
451
(New Zealand v. France).
For a discussion o-f--the illegality of these tests, see Mercer, (1968), N.Z.&
J. 405-408, 418-421, and Swan, 9 Melb. U.L.R.
296
(1973-74).
p.

74]

I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 253, 457, by a decision of 9
to 6, the Court decided that the claim (by Australia/
New Zealand) no longer has any object and that therefore
the Court is not called upon to give a decision thereon.

75]

France began testing again in 1981, and unashamedly admitted that one of the reasons that kept France in the South
Pacific was the testing grounds for nuclear explosion.
See also the Rainbow Warrior - Greenpeace Case, 1985.
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(b)

lnternatinal Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law
Whatever the views of States on the legality of nuclear

tests in the Pacific, whether or not the testing is an act prohibited by general international law, the State conducting the test
must be held internationally liable for the injurious consequences arising out of such act.

This notion of international

liabilityconstitutes a new item under study by the International
Law Commission.

The reports presented by the late Special Rapporteur,

Professor Quentin-Baxter, and the current Special Rapporteur,
Ambassador Julio Barbosa.

have received general approval of

the Sixth Committee and vJere VJarmly embraced by the developing cuntr ies
(or the group of 77).

International liability is established

even in the absence of State responsibility and in spite of
the circumstances precluding wrongfulness.
The ugly truth of the matter is that developed countries
like the United States and Japan had suffered considerably from
industrial pollution within their respective borders,

and that

considerable efforts and expenses had to be deployed to combat
pollution to protect and preserve healthy environment
the territorial confines of their own borders.

within

The European

States have concluded a Geneva Convention 1980 which has entered
into force since 1985 to ensure abatement
the level

and regulation of

of pollution from acid rains from the skies within

Western and Central Europe.

Yet,

multi-national corporations

established in accordance with the laws of Japan and other western
countries set up factories in virgin lands,
nature was still beautiful,

without

in the lands where

exporting their sophisticated

factories with all the safeguards required in accordance with
their own internal laws had the factories been installed in their
cuntries of origin.

Without such safegurds, these corporations

were able to make exhorbitant profits,

by cutting costs and
62/ ...
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corners,

not having to bear the necessary expenses and to take

the required precautions against pollution,
unearned benefits at the expense
is particularly odious,

but only to reap

of developing

countries. This

when factories such as the Asahi Glass

started in the early seventies to discharge mercury into the
Chao Phya River and eventually into the Gulf of Thailand.
injurious consequences could have easily been prevented,

Such
but

were knowingly allowed to cause pollution of the river, the
estuaries and the sea bordering the beaches in the inner Gulf
of Thailand,

injuring

the physical health of bathers, and users

of the river and sea waters,

harming river and marine plants

and fisheries of several significant species. Had such an incident
occurred in a developed country such as in New York,

the damages

assessible by a United States court could have reached billions
of dollars,

but the innocence of the Thai Government and the

avaricious greed of the multi-national corporation,

caring not

for the safety and the welfare of the host country or of its
inhabitants,

have combined to add insult to injury.

The resulting injury left permanent scars not only in the Gulf
of Thailand but also in the memories of Thai youths.
circumstances,

In like

the Indian Government has been more successful

in recovering substantial damages from Union Carbide in connection
with the Bophol

accident in the fall of 1984.

Radio active fallouts

from Chernobyl Nuclear accident in 1985

is still unresolved.
(c)

.,

Sources of Marine Pollution

Nature has its own law to regulate the equilibrium of
the environment around the globe,
sea and its surroundings.

including the ecology of the

Pollution is invariably man-made.

Pollution of the sea may originate from various sources.
all practical purposes,

For

the following sources have contributed

to marine pollution :63/ ...
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(1)

pollution from land-based sources,

such as from industrial

waste, chemical discharges from factories into the river
or directly into the sea;
(2)

pollution from the airspace above the ocean, such as
from the overflying aircraft,
from radio-active fallouts,
from nuclear explosion tests,
emission of fumes or smog,

or from acid rains and

which could be traceable back

to land-based sources;
(3)

pollution from sea-going vessels,
such as oil leaks, or
r
collision at sea, or accident of navigation, or pipelines
leakages;

(4)

pollution from marine scientific researches,
release or discharge of chemicals,

such as

electric shock-waves,

or explosives;
(5)

pollution from sea-bed activities,

such as exploration

or exploitation activities,

charges or blasts

from rigs

depth

or platforms or artificial islands,

or sub-

marines and under-water vehicles; or
(6)

pollution by dumping of toxic or nuclear wastes or chemical
compounds, ultra hazadous substances or industrial discharges,
(peace-time
straits

used for internatinal navigation requires special

treatment,
v. U.S.A.

mining of the harbour, territorial sea or
see the Corfu Channel Case, 1949,

(1986) and the Gulf of Persia 1987).

64/ ...
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(d)

Special

R~gimes

for International Control of Marine Pollution

Special conventional or treaty
to regulate
mention .
(i)

r~gimes

and abate marine pollution.

have been in operation

The following deserve

The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, 76]
provisions designed

contains

to regulate marine pollution

by

States.
Article 24 of the 1958 Convention imposes an obligation
of conduct

on States Parties "to draw up regulations

to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil
from ships
ion

or pipelines or resulting from the exploitat-

and exploration of the sea-bed and its subsoil,

taking into account existing treaty provisions on the
subject''. 77]
A further obligation

of conduct is imposed by Article

25 of the 1958 Convention,

requiring every State to

"take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the
dumping of radio-active waste,

taking into account any

standards and regulations which may be formulated by
the competent international organizations".
is also an obligation

78]

There

to "cooperate with the competent

international organization in taking measures for the
prevention

of pollution of the seas or airspace above,

resulting from many activities with radio-active materials
or other harmful agents." 79]

,;

65/ ...

761

Geneva, April 29, 1958, in force September 30, 1962, the
work of the International Law Commission, 3rd Edition, U.N.,
New York, 1980, pp. 147-155.

771

Ibid., at p. 153. Reference to ''existing treaty provisions"
is to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954, U.K.T.S. 56 (1958), Comnd.
595; 327 U.N.T.S.3.
There were as of 1982, 68 contracting
Parties.

781

Ibid. , at p.

791

Article 25 (2),

153, Ar'ticie 25
ibid., at p.

(1).

l53
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The Convention of 1958 seeks to regulate marine pollution
exclusively from sources in the sea and airspace above,
leaving the control of land-based sources to each State
to undertake necessary regulatory measures.
(ii)

The Test Ban Treaty 1963;

as seen earlier, has generated

the effect of outlawing all nuclear explosion tests in
the atmosphere over and above the ocean any where, thereby
preventing radio-active fallouts and contamination of
the ocean not occasioned by accident.
(iii)

The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage 1969

81]

entered into force in 1975

with 49 contracting parties in 1982, is known as the
''private law" Convention,

inposing strict liability on

the owner of any "sea-going vessel actually carrying
oil in bulk as cargo".

This Convention was supplemented

by the 1971 Internatinal Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution
Damage. Brussels. 82]

Victims may also have recourse

to two compensation schemes set up by tanker owners The Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability
for Oil Pollution 1969 (TOVALOP) 83] and the Contract
Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution 1971 (CRISTAL). 84]

66/ ...
80]

U.N.T.S. 3 (1964), Cmnd. 2245; 480 U.N.T.S. 43, with
111 Contracting Parties as of 1982.

81]

U.K.T.S. 106 (1975), Cmnd. 6183; 9 I.L.M.45. The Convention
was amended by a 1976 Protocol Misc. 26 (1977). Cmnd.
1028.
On October 31, 1981, there were 14 Contracting
States.

82]

11 I.L.M. 284 (1972). On August 21, 1982, 11 Contracting
States were Parties, in force 1978.

83]

8 I.L.M. 497 (1969).

84]

10 I.L.M.

137 (1971).
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(iv)

The International Convention Relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties

1269 85]

is concerned with discharges resulting from

accidents at sea

86]

in addition to the 1954 Convention

which was concerned with operational discharges.

The 1969 Convention was extended to cover
other

''substances

than oil which may reasonably be expected to result

in major

harmful consequences

by the 1973 Protocol.

87]

This Intervention Convention is knmm as the "public
law" Convention side by side with the civil liability
or "private law"

Convention of the same year.

prompted by the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967.

It \iiJas
Many

such accidents have occurred in the Malacca Strait,
the Showa Maru in 1975 and the Amoco Cadiz in 1979 off the
coas·t of Brittany .. 88]
(v)

The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 89]

has

been influenced by a number of accidents at sea causing
pollution for coastal States and strait States.

The
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85]

U.K.T.S. (1975), Cmnd. 6056; 9 l.L.M. 25 (1969). ln force
1975, on August 21, 1982, there were 42 Contrating Parties
including the U.K.

86]

U.K.T.S.

87]

Misc.

88]

The Torrey Canyon, a Liberian "supertanker" carrying over
119,000 tons of crude oil, negligently became stranded on
the Seven Stones on the high seas off the coast of Cornwall.
The Showa Maru, a Japanese "super ~anker" carrying nearly
200,000 tons of crude oil hit uncharted rocks in the Malacca
strai0
causing pollution affecting Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore.
The Amoco Cadiz, a Liberian registered tanker
owned by the U.S. company was wrecked on the Brittany Coast,
losing most of 230,000 tons of crude oil.
France now requires
tankers to keep 7 miles from her coasts in innocent passage
through territorial waters.

89]

The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10,
1982, U.N. Publications, N.Y. 1983.

50 (1958), Cmnd. 595; 327 U.N.T.S.3.

12 (1975 1

,

Cmnd 6038; 13 l.L.l1.605 (1974).
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1982 Convention contains a large number of detailed provision
on the protection of marine environment of global and
regional cooperation, technical assistance, monitoring
and environmental assessment,

and the development and

enforcement of international and national laws preventing pollution."
Article 192 imposes on States the general obligation
to protect and preserve the marine environment,
Article 193 subjects the

and

sovereign rights of States

to exploit natural resources pursuant to their environmental
policies and in accordance with the duty under
Article 192 to protect and preserve marine environment.90]
In particular, Article 194 requires States to take all
measures consistent with this Convention to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine envtronment
from any source. 91]

Measures shall include,

inter alia,

those designed to minimize to the fullest possible extent:
(a)

the release of toxic, harmful, or noxious substances,
especially those which are persistent, from landbased sources,

from or through the atmosphere or

by dumping;
(b)

pollution from vessels,

in particular measures

for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies,
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and
regulating the design, construction, equipment,
operation and manning of vessels;
68/ ...

91]

See Articles 192 and 193, ibid., at p. 70,
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See Article 194, especially paragraph 3, ibid., at p.70.
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(c)

pollution from installation and devices used in
exploration or exploitation of the natural resources
of the sea-bed and subsoil,

in particular measures

for preventing accidents and dealing with

emergencies,

ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation
and manning
(d)

of such installations or devices;

pollution from other installations and devices
operating in the marine environment,

in particular

measures for preventing accidents and dealing with
emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations
at sea, and regulating

the design, construction,

equipment, operation and manning of such installations
or devices.
Article 235 (1)

and (2) 92)

impose on States liability

for failure to fulfil international obligation concerning
the protection and preservation of marine environment
in accordance with international law.
to make available recourse

and the obligation

for prompt and adequate

compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused
by pollution of the marine environment by natural or
juridical persons under their jurisdiction.

2.

THAILAND'S POSITIONS REGARDING MARINE POLLUTION
As will be seen in greater details in specific papers

concerning national legislation for implementation

of the

69/ ...
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See Article 235, Section 9.
ibid., at p. 84.
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LOS Convention provisions regarding protection and preservation
of the marine environment,

Thailand has recently recovered her

appropriate place in the family of nations desiring to protect
and preserve the environment, including marine environment. 93]
Not unlike other countries,

Thailand has had her shares of suffer-

ing as the result of marine pollution, especially in the Gulf
of Thailand.
to devise

Like her Asian neighbours,

appropriate measures,

practical

Thailand too will have

legislative,

to cope with the situation.

procedural and
Her obligations

to protect and preserve the marine environment are far reaching
and all embracing.

In preparation for the treaty obligations.

Thailand has to brace herself and be prepared to meet new challenge,
to overcome past bitterness and prejudices.
e..
A new legislative framwork
has to be structured,
1\

anchored

in constitutional provisions, (1974), and the National Environment Policy Act to provide legal basis for the formulation of
environmental policy and planning.
blished, viz.,
Board (NESDB)

Two bodies have been esta-

the National Environment and Service Development
and its secretariat, the Office of National

Environment Board (ONEB),

with a legal sub-committee to prepare

appropriate draft legislation for submission to parliament.
A Series of legislative acts have been adopted to deal
with marine pollution from land-based

sources,

1

including the

Public Health Act 1941 (PHA) to control the dumping of municipal
waste, and the Factories Act 1969 (FAC) to set industrial effluent
standards, and to regulate the treatment of industrial wastes,
as well as agricultural chemicals such as fertilizers and toxic
substances.

70/ ...
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See, in particular, a paper by Mr.
on this topic.

Panat Tasneeyanond

SUCHARITKUL/70

Another series of legislations have been passed in respect
of national control of marine pollution from sea-bed activities,
in the form of the Petroleum Act 1971, establishing

the Petroleum

Authority of Thailand with an autonomous status, and with power
to regulate offshore oil and gas drilling, including laying of
gas pipelines

in the Gulf of Thailand, and precautionary measures

to prevent leakage.
mining of all

The Mineral Act 1967 was designed to regulate

.mineral resources,

including off-shore tin mining.

Slime and tailings emitted by the off-shore mining operations
are subject to ministerial regulationsand required to meet the
standards set.
In addition, there has been a recent legislation in
the form

of

Regulation~on

the Prevention

Pollution (RPAOP) to provide regulatory

and Abatement of Oil
basis for evolving a

national contingency plan for the abatement and monitoring control
of oil spills resulting from the accidents of navigation,
discharges of vessels, on a large scale

and blasts

operational

orblown~-

out from off-shore drilling activities.
There are some sporadic provisions in the Navigation
in Thai Waters Act (NTWA) of 1913, concerning ocean dumping.
Legislation in maritime law was long overdue,

although reference

to a specific maritime code was mentioned in the Civil and Commercial
Code of Thailand.

The National Research

Counci~

Law

Section~

did made recommendations as early as 1961 in support of the
necessity for Thailand to have her ownnationalmaritime code,
or the carriage of goods and passengers by sea.

With the advent

of Thai merchant marine and growing shipping activities now,
such a code has come into existence.

In this connexion,

vessel~ whether for commercial transport

Thai

or fishing have to

abide by international regulations and standards set by various
internatinal organizations such as : IMCO, IMO and ILO. Thus, Thai

71/ ...
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vessels must obey regulations regarding discharge of oil waste
and cleaning of bunkers, or dumping of waste in the ocean.
A curious incident took place off a Japaneseisland where the
carcas of a dead elephant was dumped by a Thai vessel, the municipality of the Japanese island took great care and spent a large
sum of money to remove the carcas and to clean the beach.

Upon

investigation, the matter was amicably settled as the Thai captain
was able to certify the whereabout

of the dump which was held

to be outside the prohibited zone for dumping.

The dead elephant

was carried by the current eunexpectedly. A compromise solution
was reached.
Whatever the status of preparedness of the Thai Government
to implement the new

Law of the Sea Convention of 1982,

there appear to be countless problem areas requiring legislative
measures and adjustments of existing regulations.

The attitude

of the Thai Government in preparation for the ratification of
the Convention must be one of cautious optimism.

The marine

environment constitutes the common heritage of mankind.
law-abiding member of the world community,

As a

Thailand supports

all forms of cooperative efforts and measures to prevent, reduce,
abate
where,

and minimize as much as possible marine pollution everyespecially of course in the Gulf of Thailand and in the

Anderman Sea, for which Thailand is directly responsible as coastal
State.

** *** * ** **** * * * ***

